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CONSTITUTIONAL LIBERTY AND THE
PROGRESSION OF PUNISHMENT
Robert J. Smithf & Zoid Robinson*
The Eighth Amendment's prohibitionon cruel and unusual
punishment has long been interpreted by scholars andjudges
to provide very limited protectionsfor criminal defendants.
This understandingof the Eighth Amendment claims that the
prohibition is operationalized mostly to prevent torturous
methods of punishment or halt the isolated use of a punishment practice that has fallen into long-term disuse.
This Article challenges these assumptions. It argues that
while this limited view of the Eighth Amendment may be accurate as a historical matter, over the past two decades, the
Supreme Court has incrementally broadened the scope of the
cruel and unusualpunishment clause. The Court's contemporary Eighth Amendmentjurisprudence-withitsfocus on categorical exemptions and increasingly nuanced measures of
determining constitutionally excessive punishments-reflects
an overt recognition that the fundamental purpose of the
Eighth Amendment is to protect vulnerable citizens uniquely
subject to majoritarianretributive excess.
Animating these developments is a conception of constitutional liberty that transcendsthe prohibitionon cruel and unusual punishment. Indeed, 2015's same-sex marriage
decision, Obergefell v. Hodges, reflects a similar trajectory in
the Court's substantive due processjurisprudence. Taken together, these doctrinal developments illustrate a concerted
move to insert the Court as the independent arbiterof legislative excesses that undermine the basic right to human dignity
by virtue of unnecessarily impinging upon individual liberty.
Ultimately, these liberty-drivendevelopments signal new possibilitiesfor the protection of defendant rights in a variety of
contemporary contexts, including juvenile life without parole
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for homicide offenses, life without parolefor non-violent drug
offenses, the death penalty, certain mandatory minimum
sentences, and the prolonged use of solitary confinement.
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INTRODUCTION

The Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual
punishment is widely thought of as providing remarkably limited protections for criminal defendants.' This understanding
of the Eighth Amendment claims that the prohibition is operationalized mainly as a mechanism for protecting against torturous modes of punishment unlikely to be authorized in a
constitutional democracy, 2 or as a means of securing a coup de
3
grace when a punishment practice has fallen into disuse.
This Article challenges these assumptions. It argues that
while it is accurate to claim that the protection against cruel
and unusual punishment has historically been limited in its
utility for criminal defendants, as a matter of modern Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence, the description falls short. Instead, as this Article claims, over the past two decades the
Supreme Court-with Justice Anthony Kennedy at the helmhas incrementally moved Eighth Amendment doctrine toward a

1 See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, The Court of Life and Death: The Two Tracks of
Constitutional Sentencing Law and the Case for Uniformity, 107 MICH. L. REV.
1145, 1148 (2009) (noting that in a recent year "more than one million adults
received noncapital sentences versus 115 people who received death sentences,"
yet "[tihe Court has focused on the tiny percent of cases" and "ignored the rest");
Erwin Chemerinsky, The Constitution and Punishment, 56 STAN. L. REv. 1049,

1061 (2004) ("The bottom line ... is that there is little in the way of proportionality
review for prison sentences."); Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Sober Second
Thoughts: Reflections on Two Decades of ConstitutionalRegulation of CapitalPun-

ishment, 109 HARV. L. REv. 355, 360 (1995) (concluding "with gloomy irony, that
the Supreme Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence . .. not only has failed to
meet its purported goal of rationalizing the imposition of the death penalty, but

also may have helped to stabilize and entrench the practice of capital punishment
in the United States").
2 See, e.g., Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 981 (1991) ("The early

commentary on the Clause contains no reference to disproportionate or excessive
sentences, and again indicates that it was designed to outlaw particular modes of
punishment."); id. at 985 (concluding that "those who framed and approved the
Federal Constitution chose, for whatever reason, not to include within it the
guarantee against disproportionate sentences"); id. at 997 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (concluding that the Eighth Amendment does contain a "narrow" proportionality principle).
3 See, e.g., John F. Stinneford, Death, Desuetude, and OriginalMeaning, 56
Wm. & MARY L. REv. 531, 539 (2014) ("[The death penalty could be declared
unconstitutional consistent with the original meaning of the Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause if it were to fall out of usage long enough that a 'tradition' or
'custom' of desuetude developed against it. Such non-usage would have to last
several generations to be considered a reliable measure of constitutionality.");
Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 595-96 (1977) (invalidating the death penalty
where Georgia was "the sole jurisdiction in the United States at the present time
that authorizes a sentence of death when the rape victim is an adult woman").
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fundamentally robust protection that has at its core the protection of the liberty interests of criminal defendants. 4
Rather than focusing on the more limited case-specific proportionality analysis or the assessment of "super due process"
procedural rights, two approaches which previously exemplified that Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, 5 the
Court's modem doctrine reflects an increasingly nuanced understanding of modem politics, and its consequent impact on
criminal defendants. In doing so, the Court has moved to a
regime where the individual defendants are secondary to a
more generalized consideration of the penological purpose of
any given punishment practice vis-a-vis any given class of offenders or category of offenses. 6 Further, in measuring the
penological purpose of a punishment practice, the Court has
additionally shaped a sophisticated and functional rubric for
assessing contemporary standards of decency.
Driving the Court's jurisprudential shift is an overt recognition of the peculiarly vulnerable nature of the population that
the Eighth Amendment is designed to protect, namely criminal
defendants. 7 The Court's recent jurisprudence reflects a
4

See infra Part II.

5 The procedural regulation approach, which is an attempt to manage the
capital trial process in the hope of eliminating arbitrary and discriminatory outcomes, is best exemplified by Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 200 (1976) (plurality
opinion) (rejecting claims that "the capital-sentencing procedures adopted by
Georgia in response to Furmnan do not eliminate the dangers of arbitrariness and
caprice injury sentencing"), and Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 428-29 (1980)
(invalidating one of the statutory aggravating factors-that the crime was "outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible and inhuman" because it was too vague to meet
the Eighth Amendment's requirement of "rationally reviewable . . . process" in
capital cases). The case-specific proportionality approach, which considers
whether a sentence is cruel and unusual as applied to a particular person, is best
exemplified by Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 303 (1983) (holding unconstitutional
a sentence of life imprisonment for the passing of a bad check by a convicted felon)
and Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 18 (2003) (affirming a sentence of 25 years
to life upon a non-violent recidivist offenders who stole "three golf clubs, priced at
$399 apiece, concealed in his pants leg"). For a robust discussion of these
strands of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, see infra notes 126-32 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's procedural regulation under the Eighth
Amendment); infra notes 139-53 (discussing the Court's case-by-case proportionality approach under the Eighth Amendment).
6 See infra notes 154-205 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's
contemporary Eighth Amendment jurisdiction).
7 See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152, n.4 (1938)

("[Prejudice against discrete and insular minorities .. . which tends seriously to
curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to
protect minorities . . . may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial
inquiry"); McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 343 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting that, especially in times of public panic over real or perceived crime
spikes, "Itihose whom we would banish from society or from the human commu-
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deeper understanding of the impact that unchecked legislatures can have on the most unpopular members of our constiAs Justice Kennedy recently
tutional community.
rights may not be submitted to a
"fundamental
underscored,
vote; they depend on the outcome of no elections."8
Concerns over majoritarian excess are not new. 9 The constitutional Framers recognized the potential for a majority of
the community to impose on the minority. James Madison
famously noted in FederalistPaperNo. 51 that
[ilt is of great importance in a republic not only to guard the
society against the oppression of its rulers, but to guard one
part of the society against the injustice of the other part. . . . If
a majority be united by a common interest, the rights of the
minority will be insecure.1 0
The Court has noted the role of the Bill of Rights in protecting
against these very concerns, commenting that "[tihe very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from
the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond
the reach of majorities and officials and to establish them as
legal principles to be applied by the courts.""
Yet, as the latter half of the last century evidences, concerns about majoritarianism are amplified in the context of
criminal defendants. The United States' prison population
skyrocketed in the 1980s and 90S,12 and now the nation incarcerates more of its citizens than any other country in the
world. 13 This flood of criminal defendants is attributable to
retributive excess as a direct result of a series of moral panic
events, whereby the public reacts to a real or perceived crime
nity itself often speak in too faint a voice to be heard above society's demand for
punishment. It is the particular role of courts to hear these voices, for the Constitution declares that the majoritarian chorus may not alone dictate the conditions
of social life.").
8 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2606 (2015) (quoting West Virginia
Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943)).
9 For a thorough overview of the majoritarian difficulty and its many academic commentators, see generally Barry Friedman, The Birth of an Academic
Obsession: The History of the CountermajoritarianDifficdty, 112 YALE L.J. 153,
176-215 (2002) (criticizing academic characterizations of the Court as a countermajoritarian institution).
10 THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison).
11 Barnette, 319 U.S. at 638.
12

See JUSTICE POL'Y INST., THE PUNISHING DECADE: PRISON AND JAIL ESTIMATES AT

THE MILLENNIUM 1 (2000).
13 Highest to Lowest-PrisonPopulationTotal, INST. FOR CRIM. POLY RESEARCH,
http:/ /www.prisonstudies.org/highest-to-lowest/prison-populationrate
[https://perma.cc/WD5M-93H9].
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problem in a way that is hysterical and out-of-all-proportion.14
Legislators, in turn, pass harsh sentences to address these
public concerns, but when the panic fades the reality of excessiveness in punishment sets in.' 5 And while contemporary legislators and executive officials work to undo some of the
retributive excesses of the decades prior, 6 if there is any lesson
from the past half century, it is that it is implausible to rely
solely on legislators to get the retributive calculus of punishment right. Further, the punitiveness of the public moodand, therefore, political action-can shift rapidly from rightsprotective to retributive.1 7
Until recently, the judiciary has remained on the sidelines,
unable or unwilling to act as a majoritarian counterweight to
provide robust protections for the rights of criminal defendants."' Constrained by the previously limited scope of the
Eighth Amendment, many judges have been at a loss to know
how to respond to continued legislative excess. For example, in
2015, the Alabama Supreme Court affinned a mandatory life
without parole sentence for marijuana possession imposed
upon a seventy-six-year-old disabled combat veteran.' 9 Chief
Justice Roy Moore called the punishment "excessive and unjustified," 2 0 and urged the legislature to wrestle with the "grave
flaws in our statutory sentencing scheme" 2 1 and consider
whether such punishment "serves an appropriate purpose." 2 2
This Article claims that the Court's evolving Eighth Amendment jurisprudence overtly recognizes these deep and intractaSee infra notes 30-96 and accompanying text (discussing moral panic and
retributive excess).
14

15

Id.

Consider, for example, that both Senator Ted Cruz (R) and Senator Corey
Booker (D) recently co-sponsored the Smarter Sentencing Act, which would reduce draconian mandatory minimum sentences. See Lydia Wheeler, Bipartisan
Bill Would Ease Drug Sentences, THE, HILL (Feb. 12, 2015, 3:47 PM), http://thehill.
com/regulation/232670-bill-targets-prison-population-through-non-violentdrug-crimes [https://perma.cc/JS6P-BUC8]. Further, President Obama announced clemency in 2015 for dozens of non-violent offenders. See Matt Ford,
Obama's Christmas Clemency Cavalcade, THE ATLANTIc (Dec. 18, 2015), http://
www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/12/obama-pardons-clemency/42
1317/ [https://perma.cc/G66F-6TQDI.
17
See infra notes 30-96 and accompanying text (discussing moral panic and
retributive excess).
18 See infra notes 97-125 and accompanying text (discussing the historic and
contemporary role of the judiciary in enforcing Eighth Amendment rights).
19 Ex parte Lee Carroll Brooker, No. 1141160, slip op. at 2 (Ala. 2015) (Moore,
J., concurring).
20
Id.
21
Id. at 6.
22
Id.
16
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ble concerns about majoritarian retributive excess. Tracing the
Court's jurisprudence over the past two decades, the Article
demonstrates the Court's gradual shift away from a narrow
and wooden Eighth Amendment framework to one that embraces the role of the judiciary as an independent arbiter of
excessive punishment. The doctrine evidences a carefully measured renunciation of concerns over the randomness of punishment toward a more holistic consideration of proportionality
(i.e. the fit between the culpability of the defendant and the
purpose of the punishment). 2 3 At the level of application, this
has resulted in a burgeoning categorical exemption jurisprudence as well as an increasingly nuanced measure of the conception of constitutionally excessive punishments. 2 4
Animating the Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudential
shift is the evolving concept of constitutional liberty, a fundamental constitutional value that Justice Kennedy describes as
being based in a "spacious phrase" in the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments, which creates, "a zone of protection, a line that is
drawn where the individual can tell the Government: Beyond
this line you may not go." 2 5 According to Justice Kennedy, this
value of constitutional liberty includes "certain specific rights
that allow persons, within a lawful realm, to define and express
their identity." 2 6 This conception of constitutional liberty as
driving the scope of constitutional rights is not limited to the
Eighth Amendment. Instead, constitutional liberty has begun
to permeate the Court's jurisprudence in other areas, most
recently and notably in the Court's Fourteenth Amendment
substantive due process jurisprudence, at least as it relates to
gay rights. 2 7 In its seminal 2015 decision of Obergefell v.
Hodges, the Court emphasized the driving force of liberty in
28
determining the content of the substantive due process right.
The development of Eighth Amendment constitutional liberty,
23 See infra notes 126-68 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's
shift toward categorical exemptions to strike down excessive punishment
practices).
24 See infra notes 169-205 and accompanying text (demonstrating the
Court's embrace of its role as the independent arbiter of excessive punishment,
which has shifted the case law away from concerns about the randomness of
punishment as applied to any specific defendant, to a more holistic consideration
of proportionality).
25 Nomination of Anthony M. Kennedy to be Associate Justice of the Supreme
Court of the United States, 100th Cong. 86 (1987) [hereinafter Kennedy Nomination] (statement of Anthony M. Kennedy).
26
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2593 (2015).
27 See infra notes 206-37 and accompanying text (describing the ascendency
of constitutional liberty in the marriage doctrine).
28 ObergefeU, 135 S. Ct. at 2605-06.
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then, has borrowed from, and developed with, the value of constitutional liberty in other discrete constitutional rights.
In refocusing the debate on constitutional liberty and the
Court's Eighth Amendment exemplification of that value, this
Article sets the groundwork for reinventing contemporary criminal justice jurisprudence, including life without parole for juvenile homicide offenders, life without parole for non-violent
drug offenders, the death penalty, certain mandatory minimum
sentences, and the prolonged use of solitary confinement. 2 9
To this end, this Article proceeds in four Parts. Part I begins by proposing and defending the claim that the purpose of
the Eighth Amendment is to guard against legislative retributive excess, especially overreaches that result from moral
panic. Part II charts the Court's gradual acceptance of this
understanding of the Eighth Amendment, mapping out the
waning influence of the previously dominant jurisprudential
strands of procedural fairness and case-by-case proportionality, and the rise of liberty-driven categorical exemptions and
functional consensus evaluation. Part III situates the conception of Eighth Amendment liberty in its broader context, arguing that the evolving Eighth Amendment jurisprudence reflects
broader normative determinations about the role of constitutional rights and judicial enforcement of those rights in a constitutional democracy. Finally, building on the Court's evolving
jurisprudence, in Part IV we sketch a likely trajectory of future
Eighth Amendment claims, demarcating both the promise and
the limitations of the Kennedy framework.
I
THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT AND RETRIBUTIVE EXCESS

To begin with, what is the fundamental purpose of the
Eighth Amendment? This Part presents the claim that the
Eighth Amendment is a structural constitutional protection
specifically tailored to curb legislative retributive excess, particularly in times of moral panic. In this Article, we use the
term "moral panic" to refer to a legislative overreaction to isolated criminal conduct. In subpart A, we explore this idea of
moral panic and the impact of moral panic on crime and punishment, specifically how moral panic typically results in excessively harsh punishments.
29
See infra notes 277-341 and accompanying text (outlining the near-term
trajectory of constitutional liberty on these contemporary-and critical-areas of
criminal justice).
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Subpart B suggests that the purpose of the Eighth Amendment is to guard against these retributively excessive laws. The
subpart argues that the best interpretation of the Eighth
Amendment is that it directs the judiciary to intervene to correct any lack of legislative restraint and modesty evident in
criminal laws and procedures. The subpart also foreshadows
the discussion in Part II and overviews the Supreme Court's
performance on that dimension, suggesting that while the
Court has historically been hesitant to employ the Eighth
Amendment such that it acts as a counter-majoritarian weight,
recent doctrinal developments suggest the Court is actively
moving to accept a broader role in mitigating retributive excess.
A.

Moral Panic and Retributive Excess

Moral panic can be best defined as "an exaggeration or
distortion of some perceived deviant behavior or criminal activity."3 0 In a situation of moral panic, a salient yet unrepresentative crime captures the public imagination. 3 1 Or a legitimate
spike in crime occurs and consequently overzealous fear and
anger spread through the public. The issue is frequently
presented in a "stylised and stereotypical fashion by the mass
media [with] the moral barricades [being] manned by editors,
bishops, politicians or other right-thinking people." 3 2
Legislators feel these same emotions. In addition, legislators perceive the desires of their constituents, both directly and
30 Dawn Rothe & Stephen L. Muzzatti, Enemies Everywhere: Terrorism, Moral
Panic, and US Civil Society, 12 CRITICAL CRIMINOLOGY 327, 329 (2004). On the idea

of moral panic, see, for example, Ronald Bums & Charles Crawford, School Shootings, the Media, and Public Fear:Ingredientsfor a Moral Panic, 21 CRIME, L. & Soc.
CHANGE. 147, 157-58 (1999) (discussing the influence of the media on moral panic

surrounding school shootings); Michele Goodwin, Fetal Protection Laws: Moral
Panic and the New Constitutional Battlefield, 102 CALF. L. REv. 781, 808-12

(2014) (addressing moral panic over "bad mothers" leading to criminalization of
normal risks of pregnancy like stillbirth); Kaytee Vota, The Truth Behind Echols v.
State: How an Alford Guilty Plea Saved the West Memphis Three, 45 LoY. L.A. L.
REV. 1003, 1004 (2012) (explaining how Satanic ritual abuse panic in the 1980s

and 1990s contributed to innocent men interested in gothic fashion and heavy
metal music being wrongfully convicted of three murders).
31

See Bums & Crawford, supra note 30, at 150 ("[Tjhere must be a belief...

that a greater portion of the population is engaged in this disturbing behavior
than actually is, or that the harm incurred is greater than what has occurred.");

Rothe & Muzzatti, supra note 30, at 329 ("[Media coverage] serves to inflate the
seriousness of the incidents, making them appear more heinous and frequent

than they truly are. Public anxiety is whipped up ....
32

).

Rothe & Muzzatti, supra note 30, at 328 (quoting STANLEY COHEN, FOLK

DEvILs AND MORAL PANICS: THE CREATION OF THE MODS AND ROCKERs 9 (1972)).
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via the media and relevant interest groups.33 Subsequently,
legislators are motivated to respond to community outrage, and
new laws are drafted and punishment is ratcheted-up. 34 And
then, inevitably, the panic fades. Perhaps the legislature repeals some of the worst excesses.3 5 But thousands and
thousands of people suffer from the now-anachronistic wrath;
and, selectively, a few people 3 6-often racial minorities or particularly vulnerable people-will continue to face the wrath in
the future as, for example, the personalities of outlier local

.

enable
33
See Bums & Crawford, supra note 30, at 159 ("Media outlets ...
'issue-identification' by which politicians are able to determine which topics they
need to address ....
34 This legislative behavior is rational according to the public choice literature, even if extra punishment is unnecessary for public safety. Public Choice is
"best defined as the application of the rational choice model," which assumes
actors will always try to maximize the achievement of their individual preferences
for their own self-interest, to "non-market decision-making" like politics. P.J. Hill,
Public Choice: A Review, 34 FAITH & EcoN. 1, 1 (1999). See generally DANIEL A.
FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY,

LAw AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 1

(1991) (specifying that public choice is "the application of the economist's methods to the political scientist's subject"); Mark Kelman, On Democracy-Bashing:A
Skeptical Look at the Theoretical and "Empirical" Practice of the Public Choice
Movement, 74 VA. L. REv. 199, 202 (1988) ("[Tlhe public choice literature ... is an
effort to demonstrate that given certain suppositions about the way political actors . . . behave, and given certain suppositions about the actual power government possess, the democratic sphere is, at its core, an arena of theft, an
unmitigated disaster that should be limited carefully, tolerated only if fundamentally powerless."); Abner Mikva, Forewardto Symposium on the Theory of Public
Choice, 74 VA. L. REv. 167, 167 (1988) (examining a debate surrounding the
public choice model of the politician); Dennis C. Mueller, Public Choice in Perspective, in PERSPECTIVES ON PUBLIC CHOICE 1 (Dennis C. Mueller ed., 1997); Elinor
Ostrom, Collective Action and the Evolution of Social Norms, 14 J. ECON. PERSP.
137, 139-48 (2000) (examining the theoretical and empirical evidence explaining
the development of public collective action, where individuals cooperate despite
acting in their own self-interest); Edward L. Rubin, Law and the Methodology of
Law, 1997 WIS. L. REv. 521, 553-58 (explaining how social science theoryincluding public choice-can be helpful to the study of law).
35
See, e.g., Erik Eckholm, Prosecutors Weigh Teenage Sexting: Folly or Felony?, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 13, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/14/us/
[
prosecutors-in-teenage-sexting-cases-ask-foolishness-or-a-felony.html?_r=0
https://perma.cc/7DPU-45BX] (explaining that, to avoid ill-fitting child pornography charges with mandatory sex offender registration, "[albout 20 states have
adopted new laws intended to address juvenile sexting by providing a less severe
range of legal responses to personal photo-sharing, including misdemeanor
charges that may be expunged, and required community service or counseling.");
Linda Greenhouse, Opinion, Crack Cocaine Limbo, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 5, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/06/opinion/greenhouse-crack-cocainelimbo.html [https://perma.cc/QYJ9-Q8FZ] (explaining that the commuted
sentences of certain federal prisoners incarcerated for "crack cocaine offenses had
resulted in the harsh penalties mandated by a sentencing formula that Congress
repudiated when it passed the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010").
36 See Burns & Crawford, supranote 30, at 149 ("[The demonization of these
is often easy because they are typically already marginalized and
evildoers ...
don't have the resources nor the creditability to counter this stigmatization.").
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district attorneys continue to use the statute, however
infrequently.3 7
This description of moral panic is not mere hyperbole.
America endured a series of moral panics in the 1980s and
1990s. 38 During this period, while violent crime did rise,3 9 the
legislative response is best characterized as retributive excess,
where the reaction was out of step with the problem. Consider
the following examples.
Willie Horton. In 1987, after disappearing while on a furlough from a Massachusetts prison, Willie Horton raped a
woman. 4 0 Republican strategist Lee Atwater used the moment
to attack Michael Dukakis, George H. W. Bush's main competition for President. Atwater's goal, in his own words: "By the
time we're finished, they're going to wonder whether Willie Horton is Dukakis' running mate."4 1 Television ads ran that used
37

See, e.g., Mike Blasky, Teacher's Arrest Based on DiscriminatoryLaw, Civil

Rights Advocates Say, LAS VEGAS REv.-J. (Sept. 24, 2012) http://www.revievjour

nal.com/news/crime-courts/teachers-arrest-based-discriminatory-law-civilrights-advocates-say [https://perma.cc/3PDW-9N3D] (describing case where two
adults, one man and one woman, had three-way sex with a sixteen-year-old girl in
Nevada and only the woman was arrested on a charge of "'solicitation of a minor to

engage in acts constituting crime against nature,' a holdover from the days when
Nevada banned anal and oral sex"); Bowe Bergdahl Charged With Rarely Used

MisbehaviorBefore the Enemy, CBS DC (Sept. 8, 2015), http://washington.cbslo
cal.com/2015/09/08/bowe-bergdahl-charge/ [https://perma.cc/EXL7-KJ5T]
(explaining that Bergdahl, captured by the Taliban and imprisoned for years until
a prisoner swap was agreed upon by the U.S., was prosecuted under a law carry-

ing a potential life sentence, despite the law having been "seldom used since
World War II").
38

See, e.g., STANLEY COHEN, FOLK DEVILS AND MORAL PANICS: THE CREATION OF

THE MODS AND ROCKERS, ROUTLEDGE CLASSICS xvii-xviii (3d ed., 2002) (detailing the
moral panic of the 1980s surrounding "cult child abuse" where Satanic cults

involved children in "torture, cannibalism and human sacrifice"): U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, 1999 NATIONAL
REPORT SERIES JUVENILE JUSTICE BULLETIN: CHALLENGING THE MYTHS 2-3 (2000)

(describing the debunked super-predator theory, which predicted in the 1990s a
large wave of remorseless and violent juvenile offenders).
39
In 1981, the rate of violent crime was 35.3 crimes per 1,000 persons-

higher than at any time before 1977. Although the violent crime rate briefly
declined between 1982 and 1989, it had risen to 32.1 crimes per 1,000 by 1992.
See U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION IN

THE UNITED STATES: 1973-92 TRENDS 1 (1994).

Additionally, media coverage of

violent crime increased significantly in the 1990s. See Sara Sun Beale, The News
Media's Influence on Criminal Justice Policy: How Market Driven News Promotes
Punitiveness, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 397, 422-36 (2006) (describing the trends

and growth in crime story coverage among network and local media outlets).
40 See Roger Simon, How a Murderer and Rapist Became the Bush Campaign'sMost Valuable Player, BALT. SUN (Nov. 11, 1990), http://articles.baltimore
sun.com/ 1990-11-11/features/ 1990315149_1_willie-horton-fournier-michaeldukakis [https://perma.cc/H3DD-2KPA] (discussing the trajectory of the Willie
Horton phenomenon in politics).
41
Id.

424

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 102:413

Horton to depict Dukakis as soft on crime: "Dukakis not only
opposes the death penalty, he allowed first-degree murderers
to have weekend passes from prison." 4 2 Then-Senator Joe
Biden said that one of his political goals was "to lock Willie
Horton up in jail."4 3 And George Bush, capitalizing on his
tough on crime credibility, told Americans, "We need more prisons, more jails, more courts, more prosecutors."4 4 Ultimately,
prison furlough programs-the same ones that Ronald Reagan
touted-disappeared. 4 5 So, too, did parole. As Senator Richard Durbin recently told the Marshall Project, "[tihe ghost of
Willie Horton has loomed over any conversation about sentencing reform for over 30 years." 4 6
Polly Klaas. In October 1993, in Petaluma, California, a
twelve-year-old girl, Polly Klaas, was abducted and murdered. 4 7 The person who committed the murder was Richard
Davis, a recidivist paroled from a California prison. The shocking murder instantly captured the imagination of the public,
lending momentum to a proposed statewide ballot initiativeProposition 184-that mandated strict mandatory minimum
sentences for recidivist offenders. Proposition 184, which came
about "[w]ithin days" of Polly's death, became the "fastest qualifying initiative in California history."4 8 A few months later,
President Bill Clinton spotlighted the Polly Klass case during
his State of the Union address commenting, "those who commit
repeated violent crimes should be told when you commit a third
violent crime, you will be put away and put away for good." 4 9
42
A 30-Second Ad on Crime, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 3, 1988), http://
www.nytimes.com/1988/11/03/us/a-30-second-ad-on-crime.html [https://
perma.cc/6JRJ-YFWR] (discussing a Dukakis "tough on crime" television
advertisement).
43

44

EVA BERTRAM ET AL., DRUG WAR POLITCS: THE PRICE OF DENIAL 146 (1996).

Bernard Weinraub, PresidentOffers Strategy for U.S. on Drug Control, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 6, 1989), http://www.nytimes.com/1989/09/06/us/president-offers-strategy-for-us-on-drug-control.html?pagewanted=all [https://perma.cc/
E2E6-KXA2).
45 Beth Schwartzapfel and Bill Keller, Willie Horton Revisited, THE MARSHALL
PROJECT (May 13, 2015), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2015/05/13/willie
-horton-revisited#.MvFXwWQqy [https://perma.cc/WQ3F-ZUWA].
46
Id.
47 Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 14-15 (2003).
48 Id. at 15.
49
William J. Clinton, President of the United States, State of the Union Address (Jan. 25, 1994), reprintedin WASH. POST http://www.washingtonpost.com/
wp-srv/politics/ special/states/docs/ sou94.htm [https://perma.cc/ZFN77URN]. On the President's State of the Union remarks, see, for example, Gwen
Ifill, State of the Union: The Overview; Clinton Vows Fightfor his Health Plan, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 26, 1994), http://www.nytimes.com/1994/01/26/us/state-of-theunion-the-overview-clinton-vows-fight-for-his-health-plan.html?pagewanted=all
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And then, to roaring applause, Clinton boomed, "three strikes
and you are out."s0 Like a virus, three strikes laws specifically-and mandatory minimum sentences in particular-began to spread across the nation. 5 1 Indeed, twenty-four states
enacted three strikes over a two-year period following the death
of Polly Klaas.
Super-predators. In 1995, Professor John Dilulio and
others warned the nation of a coming "breed" ofjuvenile offenders who "kill, rape, maim, without giving it a second thought."5 2
These are not kids, but "fatherless, Godless, and jobless"
super-predators. 5 3 Campaigning for the omnibus crime control bill, Hillary Clinton said in 1996: "They are not just gangs
of kids anymore. They are often the kinds of kids that are
called super-predators. No conscience, no empathy. We can
talk about why they ended up that way, but first we have to
bring them to heel."5 4 President Bill Clinton further amped-up
the drama proclaiming, "[wle cannot renew this country when
13-year-old boys get semi-automatic weapons to shoot 9 year
olds for kicks."5 5 This super-predator rhetoric significantly
contributed to sharp increases in life without parole sentences
for juveniles, as well as the transfer of cases from juvenile to
adult court.5 6
The Crack-CocaineEpidemic. In the 1980s, crack-cocaine
use spiked in American cities, leading doctors and other public
[https://perma.cc/KE59-HD2N] (noting that Clinton was emotional when discussing his plans to combat crime in America).
50 Clinton, supra note 49; The Book Archive, State of the Union Address:
Speech by President Clinton (1994), YOUTUBE (May 5, 2012), https://
www.youtube.com/watchv=zyb0TCJGFQ [https://perma.cc/3LJV-9MPRI.
51
See generally JOHN CLARK ET AL., NAT'L INST. OF JUST., "THREE STRIKES AND
YOU'RE OUT": A REVIEW OF STATE LEGISLATION (1997) (comparing the provisions of

three-strikes laws in twenty-four states).
52 Editorial, Echoes of the Superpredator,N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 13, 2014), http://
www.nytimes.com/2014/04/14/opinion/echoes-of-the-superpredator.html
[https://perma.cc/X9V6-THGL].
53

John J. Dilulio, Jr., Arresting Ideas, 74 HOOVER INST. POL'Y REV. 12, 15

(1995).
54 Robert Mackey, Hillary Clinton on 'Superpredators'in 1996, C-SPAN (Feb.
25, 2016), https://www.c-span.org/video/?c4582473/hillary-clinton-superpredators-1996 [https://perma.cc/R2Q4-YE5P]. Note that this is the same bill
that contained the "three strikes" law referenced by President Bill Clinton in his
1994 state of the union address. See Clinton, supranote 49.
55 Clinton, supra note 49.
56
See JOHN R. MILLS, ANNA M. DORN & AMELIA C. HRnz, PHILLIPS BLACK PROJECT,
No HOPE: RE-EXAMINING LIFETIME SENTENCES FOR JUVENILE OFFENDERS 9-11 (2015);
see also Michael Bochenek, Trying Children in Adult Courts, HUM. RTS. WATCH

(Nov. 1999), https://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/maryland/Maryland-02.htm
[https: //perma.cc/G2QN-E59J] (describing the mistreatment of juvenile defendants in Maryland's jails).
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health officials to warn of "crack babies" 5 7-the children born
of addicted parents; children forecasted to be of unsound mind
and body-and crack murders spilling out of poor, black, inner-city streets and into white, wealthier suburban neighborhoods. 5 8 This increasingly salient fear of crack, and the
violence it propelled, reached its boiling point in 1986 when
Len Bias, a star college basketball player that the Boston Celtics had drafted, died after using cocaine. 5 9 Congress immediately held hearings on the crack-cocaine epidemic wherein
legislators invoked Bias's name eleven times.6 0 A few months
later, President Reagan signed into law the Anti-Drug Abuse
Act, which contained a 100:1 sentencing disparity for possession of crack relative to powder cocaine.6 1
Taken together, these panic-fueled legislative enactments
contributed to a meteoric and unprecedented increase in our
national jail and prison populations. 6 2 At its peak, the Ameri57

See Charles Krauthammer, Worse Than 'Brave New World': Newborns Per-

manently Damaged by Cocaine, PHIIA. INQUIRER (Aug. 1, 1989), http://articles.

philly. com/ 1989-08-01 /news/26148256_1_cocaine-babies-crack-babies-dam
age [https://perma.cc/9TR6-K7QQ]; see also Stacey Burling, The Littlest Victims
of Cocaine, PHILA. INQUIRER (Aug. 24, 1989), http://articles.philly.com/1989-08-

24/news/26150896 1_babies-foster-care-supervisor-cocaine [https://perma.cc/
AW36-B4PB] (discussing the "growing number of babies in Chester County are
being born with cocaine in their systems"). But see Janine Jackson, The Myth of

the 'Crack Baby,' FAIR (Sept. 1, 1998), http://fair.org/extra-online-articles/themyth-of-the-crack-baby/ [https://perma.cc/AVR9-QFP5] (explaining the media
myth of the "crack baby" as inferior and doomed, while listing a number of articles
that perpetuated this myth).
58 See Peter Kerr, A Crack Plague in Queens Brings Violence and Fear, N.Y.

TIMES (Oct. 19, 1987), http://www.nytimes.com/ 1987/10/19/nyregion/a-crack[https://
plague-in-queens-brings-violence-and-fear.html?pagewanted=all
perma.cc/4F4H-8CP9; see also Nicholas M. Horrock, Crack Wars Push Murder
Rates to Record Level in Washington, CHI. TRIBUNE (Nov. 6, 1988), http://arti-

cles.chicagotribune.com/1988-11-06/news/8802130346_1_murder-rate-cracknightclub [https://perrna.cc/KG3T-RT3M (describing rise in violence relating to
crack epidemic).
59 See Jonathan Easley, The Day the Drug War Really Started, SALON (Jun.

19, 2011), http://www.salon.com/2011/06/19/lenbiascocainejtragedy still_
affecting us_drug_1aw/ [https://perma.cc/BSJ6-6KDV].
60 United States v. Petersen, 143 F. Supp. 2d 569, 573 (E.D. Va. 2001).
61 Easley, supra note 59.
62 Some reasons for this explosion in the incarcerated population include,
among other things, the federalization of crime; extreme political pressure to not
seem "soft on crime"; lack of political power from the incarcerated and the exoffender populations due to poverty and disenfranchisement; and a general lack
of desire to fund public services. See Erwin Chemerinsky, The Essential but
Inherently Limited Role of the Courts in PrisonReform, 13 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 307,
310-11 (2008). John Gleissner focuses on the war on drugs perpetuated by the
conservative political wing, stating that the "primary mistake made by law & order
interests, including most conservatives, is that we tried to pile on more prison
time, mandatory sentences and three-strikes legislation in a failed effort to attack
the supply of illegal drugs." John Dewar Gleissner, A Conservative View ofIncar-
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can justice system incarcerated one in one-hundred citizensa tenfold increase over forty years. 6 3 This is the aftermath of
moral panic, the outsized fear over violence in response to a
very real increase in violent crime. As one scholar explains,
"People's opinions about the sentences required for proper
criminal punishment fluctuate as a function of their current
perceptions of the threat of crimes and, more generally, their
state of fear." 6 4 In turn, legislators sense this fear in their
constituents, often lending support to stricter laws and harsher punishments based on a "public preference formed from
miscalculations of risk."6 5
Public anger matters, too. One scholar found that even
after "controlling for other factors such as racial prejudice, fear
of crime, causal attributions for criminal behavior, and political
ideology," "anger about crime is a significant predictor of punitive attitudes."6 6 Whether anger or fear is the primary driver,
political scientists have found that the data indicate that
"shifts in the public's punitiveness appear to have preceded
shifts in congressional attention to criminal justice issues."6 7
Moreover, "the public's increasing punitiveness has been a primary determinant of the incarceration rate."6 8 Consequently,
for over a quarter-century, the American justice system appeared to be a "one-way ratchet"-more punishment, harsher
punishment, less opportunity for redemption. 6 9
Yet, fear and anger necessarily diminishes over time. In
2012, for example, voters in California repealed a significant
cerationReform, CORRECTIONS.COM (Sept. 23, 2013), http://www.corrections.com/
[https://
news/article/34 129-a-conservative-view-of-incarceration-reform
perma.cc/LVK3-B8NF].
63 The Justice Policy Institute documented the 1970 prison population as
338,029 people. See Jus. POLY INST., THE PUNISHING DECADE: PRISON AND JAIL ESTIMATES AT THE MILLENNIUM 1, 1 (2000) (using data from U.S. Department of Justice).

By analyzing "the whole pie" of incarceration, the Prison Policy Institute estimates
that the United States incarcerated approximately 2.3 million people on any given
day in 2015. Peter Wagner & Bernadette Rabuy, Mass Incarceration:The Whole
Pie 2015, PRISON PoY INITIATIVE (Dec. 8, 2015), http://www.prisonpolicy.org/re
ports/pie2015.html [https://perma.cc/GN8W-ULLC].
64 Paul H. Robinson et al., The Disutility of Injustice, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1940,
1989 (2010).
65 Id. at 1990 n. 172 (citing Roger G. Noll & James E. Krier, Some Implications
of Cognitive Psychology for Risk Regulation, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 747, 771-79
(1990)).
66
Devon Johnson, Anger About Crime and Supportfor Punitive CriminalJustice Policies, 11 PUNISHMENT & SOCIETY 51, 51 (2009).
67 Peter K. Enns, The Public's Increasing Punitiveness and Its Influence on

Mass Incarcerationin the United States, 58 AM. J. POL. SCI. 857, 858 (2014).
68
Id.
69
Chemerinsky, supranote 62, at 310.
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part of the three-strikes law-ending life imprisonment for
most non-violent offenses-with 69% of the vote. 7 0 Discussing
the federal crime bill, Bill Clinton said recently that his administration had "overshot the mark."7 1 Hillary Clinton too has
noted that "[d]ecisions were made in the '80s and '90s to deal
with what was at that time a very high crime rate ... a lot was
done that went further than it needed to go and so now we are
facing problems with mass incarceration." 72 Even Lee Atwater,
the strategist who used prison furloughs to call Dukakis "soft
on crime," backtracked. 7 3 He said that he, like society, was
missing "a little heart, a lot of brotherhood"7 4 and that statements he made reeked of "naked cruelty." 75
Further, time permits robust research to be conducted
measuring the voracity of claims made in times of a moral
panic. For example, it turns out that crack babies are a myth,
with recent studies illustrating that there is no significant difference in the "long-term health and life outcomes between fullterm babies exposed to cocaine in-utero and those who were
not." 7 6 Super-predators are a myth, too. 7 7 As John Dilulio, the
political scientist who coined the term recently conceded, "de70 Aaron Sankin, CalhfomiaProp 36, Measure Reforming State's Three Strikes
Law, Approved by Wide Majority of Voters, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 7, 2012), http://
www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/11/07/california-prop-36_n_2089179.html

[https://perma.cc/75KJ-TCSA].
71 Mollie Reilly, Bill Clinton: 'We Have Overshot the Mark' on Incarceration,
HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 28, 2015), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/04/28/

bill-clinton-mass-incarceration n7164712.html [https://perma.cc/U3NJ-EL
J3].
72 Samantha Lachman, Hillary Clinton Continues to DistanceHerselffrom Her
Husband's Crime Policies, HUFFINGTON POST (AUG. 19, 2015), http://www.huffing
tonpost.com/entry/heres-how-hillary-clinton-is-talking-criminal-justice-since-

she-met-with-black-lives-matter us_55d483a2e4bOab468d9f0ec6
perma.cc/AX56-PNPF].

[https://

73 expolitico, A Little Heart, A Lot of Brotherhood vs. the Politics of Fear, DAILY
Kos (Jul. 11, 2006), http://www.dailykos.com/story/2006/7/1 1/226417/-

[https://perma.cc/8JEL-KY8M].
74
75

Id.
Atwater Apologizes for '88 Remarks About Dukakis, WASH. POST (Jan. 13,

1991), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1991/01/13/atwater
-apologizes-for-88-remark-about-dukakis/5c8be69f-4df3-4d75-8694-7b64c95
9aa62/ [http://perma.cc/BSQ6-GGNJ].
76 Katie McDonough, Long-Term Study Debunks Myth of the "CrackBaby",
SALON (Jul. 23, 2013), http://www.salon.com/2013/07/23/longtermstudy-de
bunks-myth of the crack._baby/ [https://perma.cc/BXA8-CT98]; see also Jennifer M. Handzel et al., Longitudinal Follow-up of Poor Inner-City Youth Between
Ages 8 and 18: Intentions Versus Reality, 129 PEDIATRICS 473, 476-78 (2012)

(finding that a greater exposure to "violence and poorer home environment" were
most likely to affect youth outcome rather than gestational cocaine exposure).
77 N.Y. TIMES, supranote 52.
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78
mography is not fate and criminology is not pure science."
Professor Dilulio joined dozens of other scholars in filing an
amicus brief that urged the U.S. Supreme Court to bar life
without parole sentences for juvenile offenders.7 9 That brief
noted that, "the fear of an impending generation of superpredators proved to be unfounded. Empirical research that
has analyzed the increase in violent crime during the early-to
mid-1990s and its subsequent decline demonstrates that the
juvenile superpredator was a myth and the predictions of future youth violence were baseless."s 0
Even those most susceptible to moral panic, legislators,
have indicated a softening of the rhetoric surrounding criminal
justice and the heightened punishment regimes of the past few
decades. Today, there is serious bipartisan support for criminal justice reform at the state and federal levels. For example,
Senators Corey Booker and Rand Paul are working together to
reform criminal justice.*1 Right on Crime, a conservative led
organization, has successfully lobbied for sentencing reform
across the United States, including in traditionally punitive
states such as Mississippi. 8 2 Even Koch Industries-the Republican super-funders-are investing funds into fighting
83
some of the penal extravagance of the last quarter-century.
However, even under the most optimistic of outlooks, legislative softening of punishment will not reverse all-or even
most-of the retributive excess of the past decades. The
changes that are occurring are around the edges: for example,
the crack-powder disparity is now 18: 1;84 in Oklahoma, small
scale drug trafficking isn't subject to an automatic life sen-

78 Steve Drizin, The 'Superpredator'Scare Revisited, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 9,
2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/steve-drizin/the-superpredator-scare-b_
5113793.html ihttps://perma.cc/9V3D-XCR4].
79 Brief for Jeffrey Fagan et al. as Amici Curiae, Miller v. Alabama, 132 U.S.
2455 (2012).
80 Id. at 8.
81 Jonathan D. Salant, Cory Booker, Rand Paul Push to Overhaul Criminal
Justice System, NJ.cOM (Mar. 9, 2015), http://www.nj.com/politics/index.ssf/
[https://
2015/03/booker-and-paul-re-introducelegislation-tooverha.htmI
perma.cc/82CR-JDDC].
82 Mississippi Flips Stance on Reforms, for the Better, RIGHT ON CRIME (June
14, 2011), http://rightoncrime.com/2011/06/mississippi-flips-stance-on-re
forms-for-the-better/ [https://perma.cc/32KU-HBMT].
83 Dana Liebelson, Inside the Koch Campaign to Reform Criminal Justice,
HUFFINGTON PosT (Feb. 9, 2015), http://www.huffmgtonpost.com/2015/02/09/
koch-brothers n 6646540.html [https://perma.cc/3RJN-8V931.
84

FAIR SENTENCING ACT,

American

Civil Liberties

Union,

https://www.

aclu.org/node/ 17576 [https://perma.cc/HWZ4-9MMPl; see also Fair Sentencing
Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-220, 124 Stat. 2372 (2012) (codified in 21 U.S.C.
§ 841, 844) (changing the sentencing scheme for possession crack cocaine).
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tence; 8 5 and in California, a new offense of stealing a few golf
clubs won't result in life imprisonment for a person with two
other felony convictions. 6 Yet, for thousands of prisoners, new
laws will not spell relief as legislative changes to punishment
often are not retroactive.8 7 In Oklahoma, for example, over fifty
people who received automatic life sentences are set to die in
prison for crimes that would no longer trigger that rule. 8
Further, even these mostly peripheral and non-retroactive
reforms are not happening everywhere. For instance, in 2015,
the Alabama Supreme Court affirmed an automatic life sentence upon a seventy-six-year-old man for a non-violent drug
offense.8 9 The trial judge said he wished to impose a sentence
of "less than life without parole"; but, he concluded that the
statute leaves no room for "discretion by the Court."90 In an
opinion affirming the sentence, the chief justice of the Alabama
Supreme Court concurred, but called the sentence "excessive
and unjustified" 9 ' and urged the "legislature to revisit that
statutory sentencing scheme to determine whether it serves an
appropriate purpose." 9 2
Critically, we are not immune to new incidents of moral
panic, and political moments that ratchet down retributive excess do not last forever. The thing about moral panic is that it
can sweep the nation in ways that often defy reason and prediction. A particularly salient and shocking crime, especially
85 Hannah Rappleye, They Sentenced Me to Die in Prison', NBCNEws (Nov. 9,
2015), http://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/they-sentenced-me-die-prison
-n459511 [https://perma.cc/T8AF-LLJK] (discussing passage of Oklahoma's
2015 Justice Safety Valve Act, which changed the mandatory minimum for a third
drug felony from life without parole to twenty years); see also Justice Safety Valve
Act, 2015 Okla. Sess. Laws 243 (givingjudges authority to depart from mandatory
minimum sentences for "substantial and compelling reasons").
86

See J. RICHARD COUZENS & TRICIA A. BIGELOW, THE AMENDMENT OF THE THREE

STRIKES SENTENCING LAw 5 (2016) (explaining that a third non-violent felony will not
automatically trigger a 25-to-life sentence under the new sentencing scheme);
Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012, Cal. Ballot Proposition 36 (2012).
87 The United States Sentencing Commission did vote in 2011 to make parts
of the Fair Sentencing Act retroactive. FrequentlyAsked Questions:2011 Retroactive Crack Cocaine Guideline Amendment, U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, http://
www.ussc.gov/policymaking/amendments/frequently-asked-questions-2011retroactive-crack-cocaine-guideline-amendment#NaN [https://perma.cc/5L4SWNZ6].
88 Rappleye, supra note 85.
89 Associated Press, Roy Moore: Life Sentencefor Drug Violation Shows 'Grave
Flaw' in Sentencing, AL.COM (Sept. 11, 2015), http://www.al.com/news/index.ssf
/2015/09/roy moore life sentence fordr.html [https://perma.cc/SB9L-P732].
90 Ex parte Lee Carroll Brooker, No. 1141160, at *1 (Ala. Sept. 11, 2015)
(Moore, C.J., concurring).
91
92

Id.
Id. at *6.
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one committed by a person with a prior record, however unrepresentative of crime generally, could lead to a new statute or
sentencing enhancement. Consider the so-called "Ferguson
Effect," the idea that violent crime "spike[d]" in 2015 because of
a national disrespect for the police as illustrated by people
93 It turns out
protesting police shootings of unarmed civilians.
that the "effect" was imaginary, but that did not stop the New
York Times, Wall Street Journaland other publications-not to
mention police chiefs, union officials, and the FBI-from
breathlessly repeating the idea.9 4
Fortunately, unlike in prior decades, the rise of social media and participatory journalism permitted swift and definitive
5
discrediting of the idea before it ballooned. 9 But the drafters
of the Eighth Amendment seem not to have believed that
would-be criminal defendants should be at the mercy of the
Twitter-verse when it comes to avoiding the retributive excess
of moral panics. As we discuss in subpart B, the Eighth
Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment
creates an institutional obligation for the judiciary to ensure
96
"moderation and restraint" in the imposition of punishment.
93 Evan Perez et al., FBI Chief Tries to Deal with the 'FergusonEffect', CNN
(Oct. 27, 2015), http://www.cnn.com/2015/10/26/politics/fbi-comey-crime-po
lice/ [https://perma.cc/T28G-C7QQ].
94 See, e.g., Monica Davey & Mitch Smith, Murder Rates Rising Sharply in
Many U.S. Cities, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 31, 2015), http://nyti.ms/1KACvGj (reporting

that for "some experts and rank-and-file officers, the notion that less aggressive
policing has emboldened criminals - known as the 'Ferguson effect"' explains the
rise in violence in many cities); Heather Mac Donald, Opinion, The New Nationwide Crime Wave, WALL STREET J. (May 29, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/
the-new-nationwide-crime-wave-1432938425 [https://perma.cc/HAD2-9FZN]
(lamenting that an "incessant drumbeat against the police has resulted in ... the
'Ferguson effect'"); Angie Ricono, FBI Says Public Scrutiny Impacts Policing, KCTV5 NEWS (Dec. 12, 2015), http://www.kctv5.com/story/30506367/fbi-says-public-scrutiny-impacts-policing [https://perma.cc/UNF6-6MFD] (reporting on FBI
director's belief that "officers might start to be afraid to step out of their patrol
cars" when faced with public scrutiny).
95 See, e.g., Cristian Farias, The 'FergusonEffect' Isn't Real, and the New York
Times Shouldn't Act Like It Might Be, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 5, 2015), http://

www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/new-york-times-ferguson-effect us_55e833
b7e4b0c818f61ab744 [https://perma.cc/LC8K-EQGE] (criticizing the media for
reporting on the "Ferguson effect" based on "bad math and bad science");
Carimah Townes, The Myth of the 'FergusonEffect', THINKPROGRESS (Jun. 17,

2015), http://thinkprogress.org/justice/2015/06/17/3670203/ferguson-effectisnt-real-in-st-louis/ [https://perma.cc/D7YU-ET891 (reporting that "evidence
does not support a causal relationship between the events that unfolded in Ferguson and subsequent homicides" in St. Louis).
96 Robert J. Smith, Humane CriminalJustice Is Not Hopeless, SLATE (Sept. 28,
2
015/
2015), http://www.slate.com/articles/news-and-politics/jurisprudence/
09/pope-francisand-supreme-courtoncrueland-unusual-punishment
death-penalty.html [https://perma.cc/ZHN8-C48U].
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That is, the Eighth Amendment provides a backstop against
new and continuing retributive excesses that result from moral
panic.
B.

The Role of the Eighth Amendment in Protecting
Against Moral Panic

The Supreme Court has long recognized the unique role of
the Eighth Amendment in protecting against retributive excess.
In the 1910 decision of Weems v. United States, the Court
struck down the sentence of "confinement in a penal institution for twelve years and one day, a chain at the ankle and wrist
of the offender, [at] hard and painful labor," as well as "a perpetual limitation of his liberty"9 7 (including the right to hold
office, vote, receive retirement pay, and change his domicile
without prior government approval) for a disbursing officer
with the U.S. Coast Guard found guilty of falsifying an official
document.98
In striking down the sentence as violative of the Eighth
Amendment's cruel and unusual punishment clause, Justice
McKenna held that that sentence reflected an "unrestrained"
exercise of government power, and not merely "different exercises of legislative judgment."9 9 In losing the ability to punish
Weems so severely, the government, McKenna wrote, "suffers
nothing and loses no power," because the "the purpose of punishment is fulfilled" with a lesser punishment that is of "just,
not tormenting severity" and that leaves "hope" for "the reformation of the criminal."1 0 0
As the Weems Court explained, the Eighth Amendment is
protection against disproportionate punishment.1 0 1 As we discuss in depth in Parts II and III, the idea of disproportionality
captured in the Eighth Amendment is undergirded by a deeper
principle of constitutional liberty, which includes the right to
be free from undue government coercion. When a punishment
is disproportionate-and an individual's liberty is unnecessa97
98
99
100

Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 366 (1910).
Id. at 362-64.
Id. at 381-82.
Id. at 381.

101 Id. at 353; see also Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 837-38 (1988)
(holding that death penalty is disproportionate punishment for juvenile offender
under sixteen because of the malleability of a person of that age); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575 (2005) (holding that death penalty is not a proportionate
punishment as applied to any juvenile offenders); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304,
321 (2002) (applying the same logic to the intellectually disabled); Solem v. Helm,
463 U.S. 277. 303 (1983) (holding unconstitutional a sentence of life imprisonment for the passing of a bad check by a convicted felon).
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rily restrained-the government fails to live up to its most basic
duty: to affirm the basic human dignity of every person, even
those who commit serious transgressions. 1 0 2 This claim requires significant unpacking, and in Part II we undertake an
in-depth case study of the Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence that supports this understanding of the Constitution's role vis-a-vis criminal defendants before examining the
idea of liberty as a constitutional value more generally in Part
III.
Suffice it to say, however, that this conception of the
Eighth Amendment as enshrining the value of constitutional
liberty-to be operationalized by the judiciary as a bulwark
against retributive excess-is a vision of the Amendment that
steps beyond traditional conceptions of the protection against
cruel and unusual punishment. Traditionally, the Eighth
Amendment protections are discussed as providing a backstop
against a punishment practice that was once supported by
right-headed legislative judgments, but that lost its reasonableness as society evolved. 0 3 However, this conception of the
Amendment fails to account not only for the broader conception of individual rights that the Constitution enshrines, but
the on-the-ground reality of crime and punishment in America.
As we noted in subpart A, the lesson of the past few decades is
that retributive excess often results not from reasonable legislative judgments that fail to stand the test of time, but rather
from unrestrained and immoderate legislative excess that is
induced by the fear, anger, and poor risk-management that
moral panics like the juvenile super-predator and crack
epidemics entail. In light of this, the traditional, narrow conception of the Amendment renders the provision a veritable
nullity. This is untenable. The Eighth Amendment arguably
has a significantly broader role; its prohibition of cruel and
unusual punishments, then, is in large part a protection
against this grim picture of moral panic.
This conception of the Eighth Amendment necessarily engenders a question that we have asked previously: What role
has the Court taken to promote the Eighth Amendment as a
bulwark against retributive excess in the democratic
branches?1 0 4 Unfortunately, the answer is that the Court has
See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 58-59 (2010).
See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1957) (holding that Eighth Amendment is entwined with evolving standards of decency, which required that denationalization not be used as punishment).
104
See Zoe Robinson, ConstitutionalPersonhood, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REv 605,
650 (2016) (arguing that the Court's disaggregated assessment of constitutional
102
103
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historically failed to live up to its constitutional responsibilities
in protecting these "discrete and insular minorities." 0 5 While
the Court has occasionally noted that its role as protecting
individuals against majoritarianism is particularly important
in the Eighth Amendment context, 10 6 at core, the Court's
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence presents "a worrying narrative of majoritarianism, whereby the decision to" uphold or
strike down laws relating to punishment has historically reflected the will of "dominant classes and harms subordinate
and vulnerable groups."o 7 That is, until recently, the Court's
criminal justice jurisprudence closely aligns with contemporary public opinion and the views of the political branches. 108
While a robust body of scholarship has described the Court's
majoritarian tendencies,1 0 9 these concerns are arguably amplirights-holders undermines the Court's persona as the institutional protector of
individual rights).
105
United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53, n.4 (1938).
106 For example, Kennedy wrote in Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407,
435-36 (2008), that courts are supposed to step in to ensure "restraint and
moderation" in punishment. Justice William Brennan put the point, especially in
times of public panic over real or perceived crime spikes: "Those whom we would
banish from society or from the human community itself often speak in too faint a
voice to be heard above society's demand for punishment. It is the particular role
of courts to hear these voices, for the Constitution declares that the majoritarian
chorus may not alone dictate the conditions of social life." McCleskey v. Kemp,
481 U.S. 279, 343 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
107
Robinson, supranote 104, at 646 (making this claim in a more generalized
context).
108
See, e.g., THOMAS R. MARSHALL, PUBLIC OPINION AND THE SUPREME COURT 192
(1989) ("Overall, the evidence suggests that the modem Court has been an essentially majoritarian institution."); JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED 424 (2002) ("Supreme Court

decisions by and large correspond with public opinion." (citations omitted)); Darren Lenard Hutchinson, The Majoritarian Difficulty: Affirmative Action, Sodomy,
and Supreme Court Politics, 23 LAw & INEg. 1, 2-3 (2005) (claiming that the
Supreme Court is a majoritarian, rather than a countermajoritarian, institution);

Willliam Mishler & Reginald S. Sheehan, The Supreme Court as a CountermajoritarianInstitution?The Impact ofPublic Opinion on Supreme CourtDecisions, 87 AM.
POL. SCI. REv. 87, 97 (1993) ("Our analyses indicate that for most of the period
since 1956, the Court has been highly responsive to majority opinion."); Helmut
Norpoth & Jeffrey A. Segal, Response, PopularInfluences on Supreme Court Decisions, 88 AM. POL. SCI. REv. 711, 711 (1994) ("[Numerous scholars have found

that the Court is not generally out of line with public opinion.").
109 See, e.g., Hutchinson, supra note 108, at 20 n. 119 (stating that the "'results' in legal contests 'come from those same political social, moral, and religious
value judgments from which the law purports to be independent"' (quoting David
Kairys, Law and Politics, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 243, 247-49 (1984))); Joseph

William Singer, The Player and the Cards:Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94 YALE L.J.
1, 5 (1984) ("Those of us associated with Critical Legal Studies believe that law is
not apolitical and objective: Lawyers, judges, and scholars make highly controversial political choices, but use the ideology of legal reasoning to make our institutions appear natural and our rules appear neutral.").
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fled in the context of crime and punishment due to the particularly vulnerable nature of the rights-holder.
Conventional literature portrays the Supreme Court as the
institutional enforcer of rights, with the Court typically viewed
as the bulwark against governmental transgressions on individual rights.1 1 0 Most famously associated with John Hart
Ely's defense of judicial review, this general conception of the
Court sees the institution as the protector of the rights of individuals against abridgement by transient popular majorities.111 This conception of the Court, it is argued, finds its
roots in the original intent of the Framers, who recognized the
importance of guarding against "one part of the society against
the injustice of the other part.. .. If a majority be united by a
common interest, the rights of the minority will be insecure.""12
The Court has overtly accepted this characterization of its role,
commenting in Barrette that
[tlhe very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain
subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to
place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials and to
establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts.
One's right to . . liberty ... may not be submitted to vote; [it]
depend[s] on the outcome of no elections.'1

110

See, e.g., Robinson, supra note 104, at 648-49 (summarizing the scholarly

literature on judicial majoritarianism); JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A
THEORY OF JUDIcIAL REVIEW 135-79 (1980) (justifying judicial review on the

grounds that it ensures the protection of vulnerable minorities from majoritarian
abuse); Michael J. Klarman, Rethinking the Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Revolutions, 82 VA. L. REv. 1, 1-2 (1996) (arguing that the perception of Supreme Court
as protector of "minority rights from majoritarian overreaching" is one that "exercises a powerful hold over our constitutional discourse"). But see Mark A. Graber,
The CountermajoritarianDifficulty: From Courts to Congress to Constitutional Order, 4 ANN. REv. L. & Soc. Sci. 361, 380 (2008) (discussing how judicial review
"changes political dynamics"); Andrei Marmor, Randomized JudicialReview, USC
GOULD LEGAL STUDIES RES. PAPER SERIES No. 15-8, at 2 (2015) (suggesting that the

countermajoritarian rationale for Constitutional Judicial Review is flawed); Richard H. Pildes, Is the Supreme Court a "Majoritarian"Institution?, 2010 SUP. CT.
REv. 103, 158 (2010) (arguing that the power of other government institutions
constrains the Court's ability to be wholly countermajoritarian).
111 See ELY, supranote 110, at 135-36. This understanding of the judicial role
is best exemplified by the famous footnote 4 in United States v. Carolene Products
Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938) ("[Plrejudice against discrete and insular minorities . . . tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes
ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and . . . may call for a. correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.").
112 THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison); see also supra notes 9-10, and
accompanying text (discussing the Framers' view of the Court as a counter
majoritarian check).
113 W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1942).
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However, while the Court as a countermajoritarian institution
provides a popular justification for judicial review, increasingly
scholars are challenging the depiction of the Court as "the defender of unpopular minorities."1 4 This counternarrative argues that the Court in fact functions as a majoritarian
institution, with, "the policy views dominant on the Court ...
never for long out of line with the policy views dominant among
the lawmaking majorities of the United States."' 1 5 Scholars
have demonstrated the voracity of this claim, exploring
swathes of constitutional doctrine that evidence that "far from
being a countermajoritarian institution, the Supreme Court
primarily functions to enforce and enshrine majoritarian
views, " 16 with its decisions reflecting the preferences and
views of America's popular majority. "
As one scholar suggests, the Court "does not speak for everyone, but for a political
faction trying to constitute itself as a unit of many disparate
voices; its power lasts only as long as the contradictory voices
remain silenced."" 8 Professor Corinna Lain has noted that,
114

Robinson, supra note 104, at 649.

I"5

Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a

National Policy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279, 285 (1957). For Dahl, the Court is "inevi-

tably a part of the dominant national alliance," because "it would appear, on
political grounds, somewhat unrealistic to suppose that a Court whose members
are recruited in the fashion of Supreme Court Justices would long hold to norms
of Right or Justice substantially at odds with the rest of the political elite." Id. at
291-93. See, e.g., GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING
ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? (2nd ed. 2008) (discussing how political actors constrain
the Supreme Court's decision making); LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES
JUDGES MAKE 137-57 (1998) (arguing the Court's relationship with the other

branches of government prevent the Justices from deciding based on personal
policy preferences); SEGAL & SPAETH, supranote 108, at 3-26 (explaining Congress'

influence over judicial decisions).
116

Robinson, supra note 104, at 649-50 (quoting Pildes, supra note 110, at

110); see also MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS

177-94 (2000) (arguing that popular opinion has a profound impact on constitutional law); Hutchinson, supra note 108, at 19-22 (discussing the contributions of
critical race theorists to the literature rebutting the "countermajoritarian diffi-

culty"). But cf Richard H. Fallon Jr., A ConstructivistCoherence Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, 100 HARV. L. REv. 1189, 1210 (1987) (arguing that the

Constitution has both majoritatian and countermajoritarian elements); Barry
Friedman, Dialogue and JudicialReview, 91 MICH. L. REv. 577, 629 (1993) (arguing that the Constitution is neither majoritarian nor countermajoritarian because

"government operates not to represent a majority but to hear and integrate the
voices of many different constituencies").
117 See Pildes, supra note 110, at 126; cf RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS

SERIOUSLY 184-205 (1977) (arguing that individual rights precede the interest of
the majority). See generally Roger P. Alford, In Search of a Theory for Constitutional Comparativism, 52 UCLA L. REv. 639, 674-92 (2005) (surveying
majoritarian constitutional theories).
118 Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in FeministLegal Theory, 42 STAN.
L. REv. 581, 582-83 (1990).
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"the force of majority will imposes constraints on the Justices'
ability to deviate significantly, and for long, from the public's
views.""'
This counternarrative is deeply troubling for proponents of
robust rights for criminal defendants and challenges the perception of the Court as a bulwark against majoritarian excessive in punishment.1 2 0
That the judiciary would intervene to eradicate excessive
punishment reads like an empty promise. The Court itself, in
an opinion that Justice Kennedy authored, recently characterized some of its Eighth Amendment jurisprudence as "not altogether satisfactory" and "still in search of a unifying
principle."121 Justice David Souter, dissenting from an opinion
that upheld a life sentence for shoplifting, said that if the sentence in that case "is not grossly disproportionate, the principle
has no meaning."' 22 Other commentators are even more brutal. Professor Erwin Chemerinsky said in 2003 that the Court
had declared that "there will be no relief from inhumane
sentences in the courts."1 2 3 Professor Anthony Amsterdam
called the Court's decision in McCleskey v. Kemp, where it affirmed the constitutionality of the death penalty despite powerful evidence of racial disparities in its administration, "the Dred
Scott decision of our time."' 2 4 And Professor Tom Stacy, summing up what is possibly the majority view among scholars and
court-watchers, said that the whole jurisprudence is "plagued
by deep inconsistencies" and is a "mess."' 2 5
However, echoing a theme of this Article, the majority view
is not always the most accurate. We concede that it is true that
119 Corinna Barrett Lain, Upside-Down Judicial Review, 101 GEO. L. J. 113,
160 (2012).
120 See ELY, supra note 110, at 174-76; Joseph Raz, Rights and Individual
Well-Being, in ETHIcs IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: ESSAYS IN MORALITY OF LAW AND POLInCS
44-60 (1995); see also Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 303 U.S. 77, 90 (1938)
(Black, J., dissenting) (noting that "of the cases in this Court in which the Four-

teenth Amendment was applied during the first fifty years after its adoption, less
than one-half of one per cent. invoked it in protection of the negro race, and more
than fifty [percent] asked that its benefits be extended to corporations").
121 Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 436-37 (2008).
122 Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 83 (2003) (Souter, J., dissenting).
123 Erwin Chemerinsky, Opinion, 3 Strikes: Cruel, Unusual and Unfair, L.A.

TIMES (Mar. 10, 2003), http://articles.latimes.com/2003/mar/10/opinion/oechem10 [https://perma.cc/XG4L-64L9].
124 Anthony G. Amsterdam, Opening Remarks: Race and the Death Penalty
Before and After McCleskey, 39 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REv. 34, 47 (2007).
125 Tom Stacy, Cleaning Up the Eighth Amendment Mess, 14 WM. & MARY BILL

RTs. J. 475, 475 (2005) ("The Court's jurisprudence is plagued by deep inconsistencies concerning the Amendment's text, the Court's own role, and a constitu-

tional requirement of proportionate punishment.").
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for most of its history, the Court has failed to live up to its
obligations to protect unpopular and vulnerable citizens from
legislative excess. We also concede that in failing to perform
that role, the Court has been complicit in the suffering that the
anger and fear of moral panics entail. However, we argue that
the Court's recent Eighth Amendment jurisprudence has begun to shift the mechanics and scope of the Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence in ways that portend that an Eighth Amendment
revolution is on the horizon. This shift, and its broader implications, is the subject of Part II.
II
THE ORIGINS AND ASCENDENCY OF EIGHTH AMENDMENT
LIBERTY

The goal of this Part is to chart the trajectory of the Court's
approach to questions of retributive excess challenged under
the Eighth Amendment's cruel and unusual punishment provision. This Part undertakes this goal by disaggregating and
examining three discrete yet interrelated bodies of Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence. Together, they show the modem
Court's move away from a narrow and limited conception of
cruel and unusual punishment to a more robust conception of
the Eighth Amendment as a right whose goal is to empower the
Court to curb retributive excess.
To this end, subpart A examines the Court's shift toward
categorical exemptions, examining punishment practices as a
whole, to strike down excessive punishment practices. This
shift has come at the expense of the narrow and limited Eighth
Amendment jurisprudential fault lines that focus on case-bycase proportionality analysis as well as procedural regulation
of statutory punishments.
Subpart B takes up where subpart A leaves off, examining
the Court's burgeoning categorical exemption jurisprudence.
Building on the analysis in subpart A, subpart B demonstrates
that the Court has begun to embrace its role as the independent arbiter of excessive punishment, shifting the case law
away from concerns about the randomness of punishment as
applied to any specific defendant to a more holistic consideration of proportionality; that is, the fit between the culpability of
the defendant and the purpose of the punishment. In so doing,
the Court has begun to overtly refer to principles of liberty and
dignity as driving these constitutionally directed proportionality determinations.
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Finally, subpart C takes up the functional question of measurement: if the Court is engaged in categorical exemptions
where retribution will always be considered constitutionally excessive, how does the Court determine what is or is not excessive? That is, what are the indicators the Court relies on to
determine constitutionally excessive punishments in the context of a modem democratic society? Subpart C discusses the
Court's move to a functional assessment of societal standards
of decency, which again emphasizes the value of individual
liberty as its constitutional guidepost.
Together, these discrete aspects of the Court's emerging
Eighth Amendment project evidence a doctrine that is less fastened to procedural regulation or case-by-case proportionality
review, more focused on categorical decisions anchored in the
penological purpose that the punishment serves as applied to a
particular category of crimes or class of offenders, and driven
by functionally accurate methods of assessing contemporary
societal standards. This is a doctrine that is more respectful of
horizontal and vertical federalism and more aware of the institutional limitations of the judiciary, yet simultaneously, more
self-confident in the role of the Court in guarding against a lack
of legislative moderation and restraint. With these changes,
the Court has begun to alter the course of the cruel and unusual punishment jurisprudence in ways that make a more robust Eighth Amendment plausible.
A.

Imposition of Substantive Limits on Offender and
Crime Classes

With Justice Kennedy at the helm, the Court has shifted
away from interpreting the Eighth Amendment as an instrument requiring "super due process" in order to ensure the fairness and rationality of sentencing outcomes as well as case-bycase review of excessive sentences. This subpart discusses
those doctrinal shifts.
1.

The Shift Away from the "SuperDue Process"
ProceduralRegulations

This section tracks the Court's fading interest in using procedural regulations to monitor the processes that can result in
constitutionally cruel and unusual punishments. This shift is
important for two reasons. First, as we describe below, the
procedural regulation route did not guarantee or even provide
judicial monitoring of the substantive limitations that the
Eighth Amendment imposes upon punishment. Second, regu-
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lating procedure required the Court to depart from its institutional competence and to delve into the micro-workings of state
legislatures and courts.
The rise of the procedural regulation approach started with
(and remained limited to) the death penalty.1 2 6 In 1972, the
Court held that then-existing death penalty statutes violated
the constitution because the utter lack of standards for how to
decide who lives and dies resulted in a system, which, in the
words of Justice Potter Stewart, produced "death sentences
[that] are cruel and unusual in the same way that being struck
by lightning is cruel and unusual." 12 7 States created new statutes that narrowed the pool of eligible offenders, channeled
juror discretion, and provided meaningful appellate review,
among other procedural innovations.'12 The Court affirmed
the validity of these new statutes, making explicit its faith that
these procedural protections could ensure rationality and pro-

duce consistent results.

129

Instead of monitoring the results that emerged under the
redesigned death sentencing statutes, the Court
micromanaged the capital punishment process. For example,
0
it regulated the substance and review of aggravating factors.1 3

&

126
See Margaret Jane Radin, Cruel PunishmentandRespect for Persons:Super
Due Processfor Death, 53 S. CAL. L. REV. 1143, 1143 (1980); Carol S. Steiker
Jordan M. Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts: Reflections on Two Decades of ConstitutionalRegulation of CapitalPunishment, 109 HARV. L. REV. 355, 421-26 (1995).
See generally RANDALL COYNE & LYN ENTZEROTH, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (3d ed. 2006) (outlining the Supreme Court's death penalty decisions); NINA RIVKINO & STEVEN F. SHATZ, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE DEATH PENALTY

&

(2d ed. 2005) (same).
127
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 309 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring). In
those days, at least in theory, a person who committed a rape or a kidnapping
could receive the death penalty. Id. at 341 (Marshall, J., concurring). Moreover,
the death penalty trial had but one phase. The jury did not receive a list of
aggravating factors or mitigating factors. The state simply asked the jury whether
it recommended death or a lesser sanction. JEFFREY B. ABRAMSON, WE, THE JURY:
THE JURY SYSTEM AND THE IDEAL OF DEMOCRACY 220 (2000) (describing the capital
trial process in the pre-Furnianera).
128
See generally Leigh B. Bienen, The ProportionalityReview of CapitalCases
by State High Courts After Gregg: Only the Appearance of Justice, 87 J. CRIM. L.
CRIMINOLOGY 130, 222-62 app. A (1996) (outlining post-Furmanstatutes).
129
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 206-07 (1976). The new Georgia statute
limited the class of eligible offenders. Id. at 162-63. It created a bifurcated trial:
in the first phase the jury decided guilt or innocence; and, if the jury returned a
guilty verdict, then the jury decided whether to impose the death penalty or some
lesser sanction. Id. at 163. To help guide the sentencing determination, Georgia
created a list of aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Id. at 163-64. The
jury must have found that the aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating
factors to return a death sentence. Id. at 164-66.
130
For instance, in Godfrey v. Georgia, the Court invalidated one of the statutory aggravating factors-that the crime was "outrageously or wantonly vile, horri-
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It also imposed substantive constraints on the presentation of
evidence in capital trials. 13 1 Each of these decisions turned on
the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the Eighth
Amendment, as opposed to the due process clause contained in
the Fourteenth Amendment. Unlike in non-capital cases, the
Eighth Amendment's super due process clause required
"heightened rationality" of the punishment imposed in death
penalty cases. 132 This need for hyper-rationality is a method of
regulating the risk of arbitrary or discriminatory death
sentences earlier in the process-at the level of statutes and
trials, not back-end appellate review. But it also stretches the
limits of the Court's competence; from picking apart the precise
language of state statutes to regulating the evidence admissible
in state trials, the Court looked most like a legislature in regulating these processes.
Then, it stopped. For instance, the Court rejected challenges to statutory aggravating factors,13 3 gave the states more
leeway in the evidence that they could introduce during the
penalty phase of the trial, 134 and, finally, in 2006, in an opinion
that Justice David Souter called "morally absurd,"13 5 the
Court, in Kansas v. Marsh, affirmed a state statute that directed the jury to return a death sentence when aggravating
ble or inhuman"-because it was too vague to meet the Eighth Amendment's
requirement of "rationally reviewable process" in capital cases. 446 U.S. 420, 428
(1980). See also Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 346-66 (1988) (stating
that the Oklahoma statutory aggravating factor, a homicide that is "especially
heinous, atrocious, or cruel" is unconstitutionally vague under the Eighth
Amendment).
131
The Court reversed two death sentences because of improper arguments
that the prosecutor made during oral argument. In Caldwell v. Mississippi the
prosecutor improperly implied that the Mississippi Supreme Court, not the jury,
had the ultimate moral responsibility for determining the death penalty. 472 U.S.
320, 328-29 (1985). In South Carolina v. Gathers, the Court reversed a death
sentence because the prosecutor read a prayer that was found among the belongings of the victim and used it to bolster the impact of the death of the victim. 490
U.S. 805, 811 (1989).
132
McClesky v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 335 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
133
In 1993, in Arave v. Creech, the Court affirmed a death sentence based on
an aggravating factor that required the homicide to exhibit "utter disregard for
human life." 507 U.S. 463, 471 (1993). The state supreme court held that this
aggravating circumstance meant that the defendant had to be a "cold-blooded,
pitiless slayer." Id. at 468. Unlike in Godfrey, the Court held that this factor was
not vague and thus did not run afoul of the heightened reliability standard. Id. at
472.
134
For example, in Payne v. Tennessee, the Court held-reversing course from
Gathers-thatvictim impact statements are permissible in the penalty phase of a
capital trial. .501 U.S. 808, 830 (1991).
135 Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 207 (2006) (Souter, J., dissenting).
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and mitigating factors are in equipoise.13 6 Only a decade after
Furman, Professor Robert Weisberg had already noted the
Court's fading attention to procedural regulation, accusing the
justices of having "reduced the law of the penalty trial to almost
a bare aesthetic exhortation that the states just do something-anything-to give the penalty trial a legal appearance."13 7 Twenty years later, in 2005, Professor Janet Hoeffel
declared that the Court "essentially abandoned a regime of
meaningful guidance."1 3 8

Importantly, Justice Kennedy con-

sistently joined the conservative wing of the Court to hasten the
deregulation of the death penalty.
2.

The Shift Away from Case-Specific Proportionality
Review

This section tracks the Court's retreat from another pathway through which it protected prisoners against excessive
punishment: case-by-case proportionality review. Unlike the
procedural regulation approach, proportionality review had the
advantage of being within the Court's core competency. Indeed, the Eighth Amendment envisions that the judiciary protects against excessive punishment. However, the case-bycase approach has the disadvantage of reaching into state
court decisions far more often than decisions that apply to
categories of offenses or categories of offenders, which are necessarily less frequent, broader rulings.
In capital cases, the Court first referenced proportionality
review in Gregg v. Georgia, the case that affirmed the newly
designed death penalty statutes.13 9 Specifically, the Court
noted with approval that the Georgia statute contained a "provision for appellate review . .. [that] serves as a check against

the random or arbitrary imposition of the death penalty."14 0 A
number of state supreme courts implemented this type of pro136

Id. at 181 (majority opinion).

137 Robert Weisberg, Deregulating Death, 1983 SUP. CT. REV. 305, 306 (1983)
(describing how the procedural regulations that the Court seemed to promise in
Gregg were more a mirage than an oasis for would-be capital defendants).
138 Janet C. Hoeffel, Risking the Eighth Amendment: Arbitrariness, Juries, and
Discretion in Capital Cases, 46 B.C. L. REv. 771, 781 (2005).
139 See 428 U.S. 153, 206-07 (1976) (holding that a punishment of death did
not violate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments under all circumstances).
140
Id. at 206. Moreover, the Gregg Court noted "the proportionality review
substantially eliminates the possibility that a person will be sentenced to die by
the action of an aberrant jury." Id. The Court even complimented the Georgia
Supreme Court for having "taken its review responsibilities seriously." Id. at 205.
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portionality review in the 1970s and 1980s.141 However, in
Pulley v. Harris, decided in 1987, the Court -held that the federal Constitution does not compel this review. 14 2 Following
Pulley, most states stopped providing robust comparative case
proportionality review in capital cases.1 4 3
In non-capital cases, the Court has only granted relief in
three case-specific challenges to long prison sentences-for a
sentence of "confinement in a penal institution for twelve years
and one day, a chain at the ankle and wrist of the offender, [at]
hard and painful labor,"' 4 4 the "use of denationalization as a
punishment,"14 5 and a life without parole sentence imposed
upon a recidivist offender who uttered a worthless $100 check
where the statutory maximum for a first time offender was five
years of imprisonment.' 4 6
In the 1980s and 1990s, though, the Court routinely rejected this type of challenge-including for a non-violent recidivist offender whose third and triggering offense for a mandatory
life sentence was "obtaining $120.75 by false pretenses," 4 7 a
forty-year sentence imposed upon a felon convicted of distributing nine ounces of marijuana,' 4 8 a life without parole sentence imposed upon a first-time offender convicted of
distributing 672 grams of cocaine,' 4 9 a twenty-five-year to life
sentence where the triggering offense was the theft of $1197
141 See Bienen, supra note 128, at 131 (explaining that "the majority of state
believed that Gregg meant what it said ...
legislatures and supreme courts ...
and one important difference would be the requirement of proportionality
review").
142
See 465 U.S. 37, 43-44 (1987). By this type, we mean, a comparative case
review, where the appellate court checks to see whether the current case is consistent with other similarly situated cases. As for the Court's earlier comments in
Gregg: "We take statutes as we find them," the Pulley decisions reads, "[t]o endorse a statute as a whole [as the Court did with the Georgia statute in Gregg] is
not to say that anything different is unacceptable." Id. at 45.
143
See Bienen, supra note 128, at 133 (describing-how many states pulled
away from even the appearance of conducting a comparative cases proportionality
review).
144 Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 366 (1910).
145 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101-02 (1958) (finding that denationalization
is "a form of punishment more primitive than torture" in that it is the loss of "the
right to have rights").
146
Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 281 (1983). Though not a case-by-case
challenge, the Court, in Graham v. Florida, held that the Eighth Amendment
prohibits imposition of a life without parole sentence upon a juvenile offender who
commits a non-homicide offense. 560 U.S. 48, 82 (2010). This challenge to a
punishment for a class of offenders, as opposed to case-by-case challenges, was
discussed previously in subpart II.A of this Article.
147 Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 266 (1980).
148
Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 370-71 (1982).
149
Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 961 (1991).
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worth of golf clubs, 5 0 and a twenty-five-year to life sentence
strike where the triggering offense was the theft four videotapes
worth $68.84 from a Kmart store.1 5 1 Six of these cases, and all
but one of the cases decided since 1916, were five to four
decisions.1 5 2
Justice Kennedy joined with the conservative justices to
reject the challenged excessiveness in each of the cases decided
during his tenure. Over the past thirty years, moral panic over
crack cocaine and super-predators, among other over-reactions, has contributed to an unprecedented rise in the quantity
and severity of punishment. Moreover, in the context of the
death penalty, though all indications point to the reality that
there is still no rationality or consistency as to who among the
eligible candidates receive death, the Court has expressly
foresworn the requirement that state and federal courts engage
in case-by-case outcome monitoring.15 3
It would appear, then, that the Court's shift away from
procedural regulation and case-by-case proportionality review
is merely a still more profound dereliction of its duty to guard
against a lack of "moderation and restraint" in the legislative
imposition of punishment. However, over the past fifteen
years, the Court has begun to rely more heavily on a third
approach to guarding against excessive punishments-the categorical exemption approach.
3.

The Shift Toward CategoricalExemptions from
Punishment

As opposed to a case-by-case determination of whether a
punishment is excessive, which is the hallmark of the proportionality cases that we described above, the approach we describe in this section, the categorical exemption approach,
queries whether a particular punishment practice is excessive
for a broad category of offenses or class of offenders. At first
blush, it might seem that the categorical approach is more
disruptive of federalism and less sensitive to institutional competency concerns. But there are more than one million felony
convictions each year.154 A robust case-specific proportionalEwing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 35 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
151 Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 66 (2003).
152 The most recent of these cases, Hutto, a summary opinion, was decided six
to three. See 454 U.S. at 381 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
153 See Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 43-44 (1984).
154
See SEAN ROSENMERKEL ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FELONY SENTENCING IN
STATE COuRTs, 2006-SENTENCING TABLES 1 (2009) (reporting 1,132,290 felony convictions in state courts alone in 2006).
150
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ity review jurisprudence could mean hundreds of different
judges assessing the excessiveness of punishments without the
broader perspective of the federal Supreme Court. By contrast,
categorical challenges are rare and destined for the federal Supreme Court, usually in the first instance.
The first categorical challenge cases, like the procedural
regulation and case-specific proportionality cases, emerged in
the 1970s and 1980s. During those decades, the Court held
that the death penalty is an excessive punishment when it is
imposed for the rape of an adult woman that does not result in
death, 15 5 upon an offender who commits felony murder where
the offender "did not take life, attempt to take it, or intend to
take life,"1 5 6 upon an offender who is insane,1 5 7 or upon a
fifteen-year-old offender.1 5 8 Conversely, the Court held that
the death penalty is not excessive when it is imposed upon a
sixteen- or seventeen-year-old,1 5 9 or upon the intellectually
disabled,16 0 for felony murder upon a finding of "major participation in the felony committed, combined with reckless indifference to human life." 16 1
Justice Kennedy joined the majority in these last two
cases, the first categorical exemption cases decided during his
tenure.1 6 2 On categorical challenges, then-as with procedural
regulation and case-specific proportionality review-one might
assume that Kennedy would join the Court's conservative
block. But this turned out to be profoundly wrong. In 2002,
Justice Kennedy joined an opinion barring the execution of
intellectually disabled offenders.' 6 3 He then authored opinions
which held that the death penalty is excessive when it is im-

157

Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 600 (1977).
Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 793 (1982).
Ford v. Wainright, 477 U.S. 399, 401 (1986).

158

Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 838 (1988).

159
160
161

Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 380 (1989).
Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 339 (1989).
Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 158 (1987).

155
156

162 To be clear, the evidence of disproportionality, as assessed under the thenprevailing approach to the doctrine, was weaker in these cases than in earlier
cases where the Court granted the challenge to the punishment practice. See
Stanford, 492 U.S. at 384 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting that twenty-seven

states rejected the practice); Penry, 492 U.S. at 334 (noting that only one state
rejected the practice).
163 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002). Justice Scalia, dissenting,
chastised the majority for concluding that the societal standards of decency had
changed so dramatically over a decade that the Penry decision, which Kennedy
joined, was no longer good law. Id. at 431-33 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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posed upon juvenile offenders1 6 4 and for non-homicide offenses, including, specifically, the rape of a child. 165
Based on his votes rejecting case-specific excessive punishment claims in three different non-capital cases, observers
would have seemed wise to assume that Justice Kennedy
would side with the conservatives on the idea that "death is
different," which means that this categorical exemption jurisprudence is death penalty specific. 1 6 6 However, in 2010, Justice Kennedy wrote the opinion-in Graham v. Florida, which
categorically excluded juvenile offenders who commit nonhomicide offenses from life without the possibility of parole. 16 7
As Justice Clarence Thomas underscored in his dissent in
Graham:
Until today, the Court has based its categorical proportionality rulings on the notion that the Constitution gives special
protection to capital defendants because the death penalty is
a uniquely severe punishment that must be reserved for only
those who are "most deserving of execution." . . . Today's
decision eviscerates that distinction. "Death is different" no
longer.... No reliable limiting principle remains to prevent
the Court from immunizing any class of offenders from the
law's third, fourth, fifth, or fiftieth most severe penalties as
well. 168
In sum, then, the Court has shifted its attention away from
both regulating the procedural aspects that can result in constitutionally undesirable sentencing outcomes, and monitoring
case-specific outcomes. However, over the past fifteen years,
the Court has revived and strengthened the categorical exemption approach to protecting against cruel and unusual punishment. The next subpart shows that the Court has shifted its
substantive focus away from the monitoring of random or arbitrary outcomes and towards curbing retributive excess.
B.

The Shift from Policing Randomness to Curbing
Retributive Excess

When it comes to cruel and unusual punishment it is important to distinguish between two different substantive
goals-consistency and proportionality. The goal of consistency is an equality goal, which stems from the idea that if two
164
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005). Notably, Roper invalidated
Stanford, another opinion Kennedy joined. Id. at 574.
165 Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 446-47 (2008).
166 Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 994 (1991).
167 560 U.S. 48, 82 (2010).
168 Id. at 102-03 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Atkins, 536 U.S. at 319).
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people commit the same offense, they should receive the same
punishment.' 6 9 In other words, among people who are eligible
for a particular punishment-for instance, the death penaltythe goal is to avoid an arbitrary or random distribution of
sentences. The goal of proportionality is to ensure that each
person who receives a punishment is culpable enough to warrant it. 170 The overriding anxiety here is that a person will be
over-punished-or, in other words, excessively punished. If
avoiding excessive punishment is the primary goal, then the
question is not who among a class of eligible offenders receives
the harsh punishment, but rather is each person who receives
the punishment culpable enough to be eligible to receive it.
Thus, the excessiveness question is about retributive excess.
In this section, we illustrate how the Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence has shifted its focus away from preventing
randomness in sentencing outcomes and towards curbing retributive excess in the imposition of punishment.
1.

The Shift Away from Randomness

Justice Potter Stewart best voiced the randomness concern
in the context of the death penalty when he stated, "For, of all
the people convicted of rapes and murders in 1967 and 1968,
many just as reprehensible as these, the petitioners are among
a capriciously selected random handful upon whom the sentence of death has in fact been imposed." 1 71 The concern is not
about eligibility for the death penalty, but rather about fairness
in how the punishment is applied. When the Court upheld the
post-Furman death penalty it did so expressly because the new
169

See Robert J. Smith, Forgetting Furman, 100 IOWA L. REV. 1149, 1161

(2015); see also Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1144 (1994) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting from denial of certiorari) (explaining that "consistency ... requires that
the death penalty be inflicted evenhandedly").
170 See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 59 (2010) ("Embodied in the Constitution's ban on cruel and unusual punishments is the 'precept of justice that punishment for crime should be graduated and proportioned to the offense.'" (quoting
Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 367 (1910) (alterations omitted))).
171 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 309-10 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring).
Justice Brennan's Furman concurrence echoed the same theme: "When the punishment of death is inflicted in a trivial number of the cases in which it is legally
available, the conclusion is virtually inescapable that it is being inflicted arbitrarily. Indeed, it smacks of little more than a lottery system." Id. at 293 (Brennan, J.,
concurring). Justice White, too, found the death penalty to be constitutionally
untenable where there remained "no meaningful basis for distinguishing the few
cases in which it is imposed from the many cases in which it is not." Id. at 313
(White, J., concurring).
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statutes eliminated any "substantial risk that [the punishment]
would be inflicted in an arbitrary and capricious manner."1 7 2
By the late 1980s, however, the Court seemed to sour on
the randomness rationale. In Pulley v. Harris, the Court provided one reason why the Eighth Amendment did not require
comparative case proportionality review in capital cases: "This
sort of proportionality review presumes that the death sentence
is not disproportionate to the crime in the traditional sense,"
but rather queries "whether the penalty is nonetheless unacceptable in a particular case because disproportionate to the
punishment imposed on others convicted of the same
crime."1 7 3 Shortly thereafter, the Court, in McCleskey v. Kemp,
brushed off the idea that the Court should care about consistency in any careful sense, calling any "discrepancy" that a
study showing racially disparate outcomes presented "a far cry
from the major systemic defects identified in Furman," and recasting its prior cases as finding "that constitutional guarantees are met when the mode for determining guilt or
punishment itself has been surrounded with safeguards to
make it as fair as possible." 17 4
2.

The Shift Toward Curbing Retributive Excess

This section describes the shift towards a greater emphasis
on ensuring that punishments do not suffer from retributive
excess. Again, unlike randomness, the concern over retributive excess is that the offender possesses insufficient culpability to warrant the degree of punishment in question.
Excessiveness is a concept measured in relation to retribution, which "reflects society's and the victim's interests in seeing that the offender is repaid for the hurt he caused."1 7 5
Retribution is at the core of the criminal law-enjoying the
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188 (1976) (plurality opinion).
Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 43 (1984).
McClesky v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 312-13 (1987) (internal quotation marks
and alterations omitted).
175
Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 442 (2008). As Justice Stevens, writing for the Court in Atkins explained: 'The Eighth Amendment succinctly prohibits 'excessive' sanctions . . . it is a precept of justice that punishment for crime
should be graduated and proportioned to the offense . . . [tihus, even though
imprisonment for ninety days is not, in the abstract, a punishment which is either
cruel or unusual, it may not be imposed as a penalty for the 'status' of narcotic
addiction, because such a sanction would be excessive. As Justice Stewart explained in Robinson [v. California: 'Even one day in prison would be a cruel and
unusual punishment for the 'crime' of having a common cold."' Atkins v. Virginia,
536 U.S. 304, 311 (2002) (internal quotation marks, citations, and alterations
omitted) (quoting Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962)).
172

173
174
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support of legal scholars and philosophers, judges, and the lay
intuitions of the American people.17 6 Nonetheless, it is also the
punishment goal "that most often can contradict the law's own
ends" and violate "the constitutional commitment to decency
and restraint."' 7 7 This tendency towards retributive excess
has two main drivers. First, as Justice Brennan put the point,
"[tihose whom we would banish from society or from the
human community itself often speak in too faint a voice to be
78
Second, in
heard above society's demand for punishment."s
times of moral panic, when fear and anger prevail, it is difficult
to calibrate retribution.
When legislatures go too far, it is the role of the Court to
provide a check. Recall from Weems, though, the 1910 case
involving the disbursement officer in the Philippines, that the
Court understood the validity of "different exercises of legislative judgment," which fell outside the ambit of the Eighth
Amendment, but claimed for itself the right to guard against
"unrestrained" legislative power.17 9 Eighty years later, Justice
Kennedy, concurring in a decision rejecting a challenge to a
sentence of life imprisonment for a drug offense, reiterated that
proportionality is a "narrow" principle that "forbids only extreme sentences that are grossly disproportionate to the
176
See, e.g., Furman, 408 U.S. at 308 (Stewart, J., concurring) ("The instinct
for retribution is part of the nature of man, and channeling that instinct in the
administration of criminal justice serves an important purpose in promoting the
stability of a society governed by law."); H.L.A. Hart, Prolegomenon to the Principles
of Punishment, in PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 7 (2008) ("Retribution, defined
simply as the application of the pains of punishment to an offender who is morally
guilty, may figure among the conceivable justifying aims of a system of punishment."); IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 106 (Mary Gregor trans.,
1991) ("If... he has committed a murder he must die. Here there is no substitute
that will satisfy justice. There is no similarity between life, however wretched it
may be, and death, hence no likeness between the crime and the retribution
unless death is judicially carried out upon the wrongdoer . . . "); Chad Flanders,
Can Retributivism be Saved?, 2014 BYU L. REV. 309, 309 (2014) ("Retributive
theory has long held pride of place among theories of criminal punishment in both
philosophy and in law.").
177 Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 420. A vocal minority of the Court including, most
ferociously, Justices Rehnquist, Scalia and Thomas, recoil at the notion that the
Eighth Amendment is a protection against retributively disproportionate punishment. See Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 32 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring)
("In my view, the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause of the Eighth Amendment contains no proportionality principle."); Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S.
957, 974 (1991) (finding "it most unlikely that the English Cruell and Unusuall
Punishments Clause was meant to forbid 'disproportionate' punishments" and
noting "even less likelihood that proportionality of punishment was one of the
traditional 'rights and privileges of Englishmen' apart from the Declaration of
Rights, which happened to be included in the Eighth Amendment").
178
McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 343 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
179 Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 381 (1910).
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crime." 18 0 In other words, as the Weems Court expressed, the
Eighth Amendment is not concerned with legislative discretion,
but rather only serious legislative overreach. 18 1 The Court
later adopted Kennedy's concurrence,1 8 2 which means that
current jurisprudence does recognize some retributive constraint on non-capital punishments. Nonetheless, in the three
case-specific non-capital proportionality cases decided during
his tenure, Justice Kennedy did not vote to invalidate any of

the respective sentences.

183

In our view, this outcome reveals less about retribution
than it does about an aversion to case-specific proportionality
review. However, a reasonable observer analyzing Justice Kennedy's opinions in Eighth Amendment cases between when he
joined the Court in 1987 through 2003 when he voted to reject
the last of the case-specific proportionality cases, could not be
faulted for assuming that Justice Kennedy-along with the
other conservative members of the Court-favored neither a
focus on randomness nor a robust commitment to curbing retributive excess.
This all changed, though, alongside the rise in importance
of the categorical exemption approach. Under this doctrine,
which encompasses six cases over the past fifteen years, Justice Kennedy-and the Court-has focused on curbing retributive excess in three different senses.' 8 4 First, the punishment
must not be retributively extravagant relative to the offense.
For instance, in Kennedy v. Louisiana, the case challenging the
death penalty for the rape of a child, Justice Kennedy's majority opinion explained that "[tihe incongruity between the crime
of child rape and the harshness of the death penalty poses
risks of overpunishment."1 8 5
Second, a punishment must not be excessive relative to the
culpability of the offender. For example, in Roper v. Simmons,
Hamietin, 501 U.S. at 959 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
See id. at 998-99.
182
See Ewing, 538 U.S. at 23-24.
183 See id. at 13; Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 65 (2003); Harrnelin, 501
U.S. at 960.
184
See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002) (barring the death penalty
for intellectually disabled offenders); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575 (2005)
(barring the death penalty for juvenile offenders); Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S.
407, 446-47 (2008) (holding that the death penalty is unconstitutional for nonhomicide offenses); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 82 (2010) (holding that life
without the possibility of parole is an excessive punishment for a juvenile who
commits a non-homicide offenses); Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2475
(2012) (barring mandatory life without parole for juvenile offenders); Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986, 1990 (2014) (applying the Atkins decision).
185 554 U.S. at 441-42.
180

181
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the Court, with Kennedy at the helm, underscored that "[flrom
a moral standpoint it would be misguided to equate the failings
of a minor with those of an adult, for a greater possibility exists
that a minor's character deficiencies will be reformed."1 8 6
Thus, "[rietribution is not proportional if the law's most severe
penalty is imposed on one whose culpability or blameworthiness is diminished, to a substantial degree, by reason of youth
and immaturity."1 8 7
The third sense in which the Court has elevated the importance of curbing retributive excess is a point adjacent to the
last point. Namely, the Court has elevated the notion that retribution in terms of moral culpability is not solely a backwardlooking enterprise. For example, in Graham v. Florida, the
Court, underscoring that few, if any, juveniles possess an "irretrievably depraved character,"1 8 8 focused on the idea that children change, often profoundly so.1 8 9 The Court stated that,
"By denying the defendant the right to reenter the community,
the State makes an irrevocable judgment about that person's
value and place in society. This judgment is not appropriate in
light of a juvenile nonhomicide offender's capacity for change
and limited moral culpability."1 9 0 Thus, in additional to crime
specific calculations of desert, the Court's categorical exemption cases focus on both the culpability of the transgressor at
the time of the offense and the possibility that she or he will be
redeemed over time.
The move towards a more robust purposive focus on retributive excess compliments the move towards the categorical exemption approach to deciding Eighth Amendment questions.
But how does the Court know whether a punishment is excessive? The next subpart illustrates that the Court has shifted its
methods for answering that critical question.
C.

The Move to a Functional Assessment of Societal
Standard of Decency

In categorical exemption cases, especially the few decided
in the 1970s and 1980s, when the Court turns to "objective
186 543 U.S. at 570. Juveniles, the Court explained, have a "susceptibility" to
"immature and irresponsible behavior," a "vulnerability and comparative lack of
control over their immediate surroundings," and their "struggle to define their
identity means it is less supportable to conclude that even a heinous crime committed by a juvenile is evidence of irretrievably depraved character." Id.
187
188
189
190

Id. at 571.
560 U.S. at 68.
See id. at 72-73.
Id. at 74.
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indicia"191 of societal consensus to glean whether the punishment in question comports with contemporary norms, it reads
as though that inquiry is an end in itself. However, along with
the rise in retributive excess as the purpose of the categorical
exemption approach, it has become increasingly clear that the
goal of considering objective indicators of societal standards is
to glean whether the punishment is in fact retributively excessive. Unsurprisingly, then, in recent cases, the Court has
moved towards a more robust, functional assessment of societal standards.
The early categorical challenge cases relied heavily on legislative enactments as the measure for societal consensus. For
example, in Coker, the Court invalidated the death penalty for
the rape of an adult woman where only Georgia permitted the
practice.1 9 2 Conversely, in Stanford, the Court rejected a challenge to juvenile executions where twenty-seven states barred
the death penalty for juveniles (with only twelve of thirty-seven
capital punishment states barring the death penalty for seventeen-year-old, as opposed to sixteen-year-old, offenders).' 9 3
This focus on state legislative enactments made good sense if
one believes that legislatures make rational decisions based
upon the preferences of state citizens. If any new modes of
punishment, such as a return of the thumbscrew, happened to
slip through a legislature, they would be judged against the
broad sweep of history and the judgment of the state legislatures collectively. But this static approach does not fit well
with the idea of the Eighth Amendment as a protection against
moral panic. The moral panics that fueled changes to drug
laws and juvenile sentencing in the wake of the crack epidemic
and the super-predator scare resulted from legislators, who
along with their constituents, got swept up in the moment. 1

191

Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976).

192 Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 600 (1977). Moreover, in Enmund, the
Court counted forty-two states that legislatively barred the death penalty for a
person who "somehow participated in a robbery in the course of which a murder
was committed" under circumstances "where a defendant did not take life, attempt to take it, or intend to take life." Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 792-93
(1982).
193 Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 384 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting).

194 Moreover, when the panic recedes, there are serious difficulties in passing
justice reform that repeals the harshness of sentences for serious offenses. First,
an aberrational prisoner who is released early may reoffend, and legislators may
worry about the public's lack of context or risk-savvy. Second, perversely, when it
comes to long-term disuse of a punishment practice, it may be difficult to get the
issue on the legislative agenda.
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The Court's decisions over the past fifteen years, and especially since 2010, are more sensitive to the realities of legislative excess than the rigid approach of bean counting state
legislative enactments to determine societal tolerance for a
punishment practice. For example, in Atkins, the Court explained that "[ilt is not so much the number of these States that
is significant, but the consistency of the direction of
change."19 5 Significant trend evidence is more sensitive to the
realities of legislation than a count of the absolute number of
states that legislatively prohibit a punishment. This is so because anti-crime legislation is difficult to pass due to the lack of
a powerful lobby, the risk of being labeled soft on crime, and
the possibility that a statistical outlier case results in a violent
crime. 196

Another doctrinal development that increased the robustness of the inquiry into prevailing societal norms is a focus on
the importance of on-the-ground usage indicators for detecting
whether a punishment practice is retributively extravagant.
The Coker Court noted that juries rejected the death penalty in
at least 90% of Georgia capital rape cases.1 9 7 But, on the
whole, jury verdicts felt like a ride-along element of the legislative enactment analysis as opposed to an independent consideration. However, in Graham, the Court transformed on-theground usage data from a sideshow into the main event. 198
Three-quarters of the states and the federal government formally authorized life without parole for juvenile offenders; 19 9
nonetheless, in finding a societal rejection of the practice, the
Court relied on the exceedingly infrequent resort to the punishment. Indeed, "nationwide there [were] only [123] juvenile offenders serving sentences of life without parole for
nonhomicide offenses." 2 0 0 This usage number is more compelling than legislative judgments because it illustrates that "in
195

Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 315 (2002).

196 See id. at 315-16 ("Given the well-known fact that anticrime legislation is
far more popular than legislation providing protections for persons guilty of violent crime, the large number of States prohibiting the execution of mentally retarded persons . . . provides powerful evidence that today our society views
mentally retarded offenders as categorically less culpable than the average
criminal.").
197 433 U.S. at 597.
198 See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 63-67 (2010).
199
See id. at 62 (noting that thirty-seven states, the District of Columbia, and

the federal government authorize juvenile sentences of life without parole).
200
Id. at 62-63. The Court reached this number by adding the 109 juvenile
offenders accounted for in a study to an additional fourteen excluded from the
study that the Court was able to count independently. Id. at 64.
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proportion to the opportunities for its imposition, life without
parole sentences for juveniles convicted of nonhomicide
crimes" were an exceedingly rare punishment. 2 0 1
If the sentence is exceedingly rare relative to its availability,
then there is good reason to believe that the hysteria has fizzled
out. This is true because when it comes to the actual imposition of a punishment, unlike legislatures or public opinion
polls, real cases involve real people forced to make difficult
moral determinations. A major contributor to retributive extravagance, especially in the midst of moral panics, is a dehumanization of the perpetrators of crime. 20 2 A person who
commits a homicide becomes a wild beast. A teenager becomes
a super-predator. But a super-predator as an abstraction is
one thing. A fourteen-year-old kid, in the flesh, with the context of the crime and the story of that kid's life at hand, is
another.
An additional factor that Court has emphasized recently is
the extreme geographic isolation of punishment practice. For
example, in Graham, Florida alone accounted for 77 of the 123
life without parole sentences nationally-and only ten other
states had a juvenile serving life without parole. 2 0 3 The degree
of geographic isolation provides further context to the standards of decency inquiry because it asks how much of the
sentencing activity in question is explained by a few outlier
jurisdictions-states or counties-as opposed to being evenly
distributed across the nation.
The point here is not an arbitrariness point-namely, that
there is an unfairness when an eligible defendant who lives in Y
county receives the challenged punishment when a similarly
situated defendant in X county does not receive the challenged
punishment. Instead, the point is that it is difficult to justify
the retributive necessity of the challenged punishment if most
eligible defendants in most counties within a state (or states
within the country) do not receive it. In other words, extreme
outlier usage by a particular office in a particular county tends
to say more about that county (and probably less about the
residents than the prosecutor's office or individual prosecutors)
Id. at 66.
See Robert J. Smith et al., The Racial Architecture of Retribution: An
Empircal Study of 500 Jury Eligible Citizens 17-19 (Mar. 2, 2016) (unpublished
manuscript) (draft on file with author) (describing how dehumanization occurs in
the criminal justice system, and how anger and fear also ratchet up the panic and
punishment).
203
560 U.S. at 64.
201

202
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than it does about the standards of decency of the nation as a
whole.
Taken together, infrequency of imposition and geographic
isolation are very important tools for gauging societal standards. Again, if a sentence is imposed infrequently or in a
geographically isolated pattern, that is an important sign that
the punishment is not necessary-for, if the punishment were
necessary to achieve a retributive purpose, wouldn't it be imposed routinely and evenly?
Finally, in Hall v. Florida, the Court displayed flexibility in
how it describes the status of states as retaining a punishment
practice. Instead of simply counting legislative enactments
from years-or, more often, decades ago, the Court counted
Oregon as a death penalty abolitionist state because the governor "suspended the death penalty" and the state had "executed
only two individuals in the past 40 years." 2 0 4 The Court, with
Justice Kennedy authoring the opinion, also described why
some of the other states that formally retained an Ig cutoff for
intellectual disability claims (the practice at issue in Hall)
should not count as fully part of the retentionist jurisdictions:
Kansas has not had an execution in almost five decades, and
so its laws and jurisprudence on this issue are unlikely to
receive attention on this specific question. Delaware has executed three individuals in the past decade, while Washington
has executed one person, and has recently suspended its
death penalty. None of the four individuals executed recently
in those States appears to have brought a claim similar to
that advanced here. 2 0 5
In sum, the Court has moved away from a wooden, constrained
approach for detecting social norms to a more flexible, robust
approach to answering the precise question-do societal standards indicate that this punishment meaningfully contributes
to the need for retribution? In other words, this more functional, sophisticated accounting of societal standards permits a
more accurate determination of retributive excess; and, in
turn, that more accurate determination of retributive excess
facilitates the Court's move to more substantive and categorical
Eighth Amendment interventions.
In the next Part, we take a step back and query what is
driving the Court, and especially Justice Kennedy, towards this
more robust Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. Rather than a
new gloss on a contested historical debate over the exact mean204

Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986, 1997 (2014).

205

Id. (internal citation omitted).
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ing of the Eighth Amendment, or a closer textual read of the
words in the statute, Justice Kennedy, as the next Part shows,
is motivated by the deeper liberty and dignity principles that
undergird the Eighth Amendment. For Justice Kennedy, the
doctrine should align as neatly as possible with the goal of
assessing whether a punishment practice fails to meaningfully
contribute to some lawful retributive goal. It is this overarching
commitment to liberty, one that we describe more closely in the
next Part, that inspired the reshaping of the Eighth Amendment jurisprudence in ways that spotlight retributive excess
and glean from society in as much detail as possible the contemporary standards of decency.
III
LIBERTY AS A CONSTITUTIONAL VALUE

This Part is concerned with extracting and articulating
what is animating the shift in the Court's Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence. This Part suggests that, in its aggregation, the
Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence presents an evolving
conception of constitutionalliberty that has driven, and continues to drive, the Court's Eighth Amendment doctrinal developments. We recognize that in reaching this conclusion we face
the potential criticism of interpretive overreach-that is, extrapolating a significant general (and generalizable) principle from
a small sample of cases in a limited context. However, it turns
out that the Court has made similar shifts from narrow and
wooden doctrinal determinations to broader individual liberty
determinations in the context of other constitutional rights,
specifically in its substantive due process jurisprudence.
The developing concept of constitutional liberty, then, can
be understood as an exercise in symbiotic constitutional borrowing, whereby the Court has quietly but actively imported
substantive due process (and vice-versa) ideas in order to
transform the Eighth Amendment and realign its protections
with "prevailing community sentiments or experience." 2 0 6 The
consequence of this symbiotic constitutional borrowing is that
the transformation of the Eighth Amendment doctrine is substantially aligned with the shifts in the substantive due process
jurisprudence as it relates to marriage. Drawing on the ascen206

Nelson Tebbe & Robert L. Tsai, ConstitutionalBorrowing, 108 MICH. L. REV.

459, 478 (2010) (explaining that this type of borrowing, or "displacement," pursues a "goal of ensuring that the imported ideas eventually come to dominate
prevalent ideas and restructure the relationships among governing constitutional
norms").
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dency of constitutional liberty in the marriage doctrine as we
explicate the principle of constitutional liberty, then, can foretell to some degree the likely direction of the Court's developing
Eighth Amendment doctrine. 2 0 7
As a first order issue, we must define this idea of constitutional liberty. By constitutional liberty we refer to the core of
the deep values undergirding constitutional rights, as recognized by the Court. A "spacious phrase," liberty includes the
freedom to maintain "a zone of liberty, a zone of protection, a
line that is drawn where the individual can tell the Government: Beyond this line you may not go." 2 0 8 It also includes
"certain specific rights that allow persons, within a lawful
realm, to define and express their identity." 2 0 9 For instance,
the reach of constitutional liberty includes at least the specific
right of marriage and the right to parental choice in raising a
child. 2 1 0 And in its protection of these things and more, the
value of liberty promotes and protects human dignity itself, or,
in other words, the intrinsic worth of every human being. 2 1 1
Justice Kennedy, who is at the helm of the liberty-based
evolution of both the Eighth Amendment jurisprudence and
the substantive fundamental rights doctrine, treats these
terms liberty and dignity as near synonyms, two words that
cast light from different angles to express the full meaning of
207
In addition, it adds legitimacy to our observations, as well as the doctrinal
path outlined by Kennedy more generally. See id. at 478-79 (noting that efforts to
apply equality ideas to the religion clauses in the past two decades have "produced a dramatic reordering of expectations as to the scope of rights and institutional obligations such that one could say that, for better or worse, the analytical
frameworks and vocabulary associated with equality have largely displaced earlier
readings of the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses").
208
Kennedy Nomination, supranote 25, at 86 (statement of Justice Anthony
M. Kennedy).
209
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2593 (2015).
210
See id. at 2598-99 (2015) ("The nature of injustice is that we may not
always see it in our own times. The generations that wrote and ratified the Bill of
Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment did not presume to know the extent of
freedom in all of its dimensions, and so they entrusted to future generations a
charter protecting the right of all persons to enjoy liberty as we learn its meaning."); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex reL. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) ("We are
dealing here with legislation which involves one of the basic civil rights of man.
Marriage and procreation are fundamental to the very existence and survival of
the race."); Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925) ("The fundamental
theory of liberty upon which all governments in this Union repose excludes any
general power of the State to standardize its children . . . . The child is not the
mere creature of the State; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the
right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional
obligations.").
211
See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2608.
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the core concept that the Constitution aims to protect. 2 12 For
example, in Obergefell v. Hodges, the Court described the right
to marry one's same-sex partner as an "ask for equal dignity in
the eyes of the law." 2 1 3 As Professor Lawrence Tribe recently
explained, 'The language of dignity is not accidental," indeed,
"the concept of dignity is central to contemporary human rights
[and] also has deep roots in the Christian notion
discourse ...
of grace, extended to all humanity in equal measure." 2 14 This
liberty principle requires "governmental actions [to] pass far
more stringent tests when they impinge upon liberty in ways
that demean the individual," 2 15 for instance, in ways that "negatively affect[ ] a person's dignity." 21 6
This base value of liberty is understandably most visible in
the Court's Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process
jurisprudence, specifically as relating to the rights of same-sex
couples. 2 17 This body of law, which began to evolve shortly
after Justice Kennedy's arrival on the court, reached its crescendo last June with the decision in Obergefell.2 18 There, Justice Kennedy wrote, "The Constitution promises liberty to all
within its reach, a liberty that includes certain specific rights
that allow persons, within a lawful realm, to define and express
their identity." 2 19 For Kennedy, "liberties extend to certain personal choices central to individual dignity and autonomy, including intimate choices that define personal identity and
beliefs," and "[clhoices about marriage shape an individual's
destiny. "220
212

Harvard Law School, Supreme Court Associate Justice Anthony Kennedy

Visits HLS, YOUTUBE (Oct. 26, 2015), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZHbMP

nA5nOg [https://perma.cc/HHA7-SNPH].
213
Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2608.
214
Laurence H. Tribe, Equal Dignity: Speaking Its Name, 129 HARv. L. REv. F.
16, 20 (2015).
215
HELEN J. KNOWLES, THE TIE GOES TO FREEDOM: JUSTICE ANTHONY M. KENNEDY
ON LIBERTY 5 (2009).
216
217

Id.
See, e.g., United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2695-96 (2013) (holding that the federal government's definition of marriage as a heterosexual union
was an unconstitutional deprivation of liberty to individuals in state-recognized
same-sex marriages); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578-79 (2003) (striking
down a Texas sodomy law and thus legalizing same-sex acts throughout the
United States); see also Kenji Yoshino, A New Birth of Freedom?: Obergefell v.
Hodges, 129 HARV. L. REv. 147, 169-70 (2015) (describing Justice Kennedy's
methodology of deploying the "argot of liberty" to address substantive due process
questions in Obergefell, Windsor, and Lawrence).
218 See Yoshino, supra note 217, at 148 (explaining that Obergefell became a
"game changer for substantive due process jurisprudence" by placing a strong
emphasis on the "intertwined nature of liberty and equality").
219
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2593 (2015).
220
Id. at 2597-99.
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This clear identification of the importance of liberty as driving the majority's decision making in Obergefell is the product
of a slow and incremental development in the Court's substantive due process jurisprudence. 2 2 1 With roots in Justice
Harlan's seminal dissent in Poe v. Ullman,2 2 2 under Kennedy's
formulation the value of constitutional liberty originates from
the premise that, as a nation, we have recognized the need for
respecting the liberty of all individuals. Justice Harlan's conception of liberty directs courts to see liberty not as "any
formula," but instead a weighted measure that protects a person from unwanted governmental intrusions. 2 2 3
This conception of a liberty formula refers to the deeply
contested divide on the Court over how the Court was to determine which rights were fundamental liberty rights pursuant to
the substantive due process clause. On the one hand is
Justice Harlan's (and Justice Kennedy's) broad and inclusive
conception of liberty; an approach that Professor Tribe describes as "universally accessible [and] nontechnical" in its
prose. 2 2 4 On the other is the "wooden three-prong test focused
on tradition, specificity, and negativity," best articulated by a
majority of the Court in the 1997 case of Washington v. Glucksberg.2 2 5 Under this limited approach, fundamental rights are
cabined by backward-looking and narrow conceptions of liberty, an approach that resulted in the Court declining to extend
Fourteenth Amendment liberty to, for example, the right to
die. 2 2

6

221 See generally Tribe, supra note 214, at 16 ("[Obergefell] represents the
culmination of a decades-long project that has revolutionized the Court's fundamental rights jurisprudence."); Yoshino, supra note 217 (arguing that Obergefell

was a conclusion of a doctrinal evolution that places antisubordination concerns
at the center of a due process analysis).
222 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). The majority's adoption
of the opinion in PlannedParenthoodv. Casey has given Justice Harlan's dissent

precedential weight. 505 U.S. 833, 848-49 (1992).
223 Poe, 367 U.S. at 542 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
224

Tribe, supranote 214, at 23.

225 Id. at 16. The Glucksberg Court required that a right be "deeply rooted in
this Nation's history and tradition" as well as "implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty" to be recognized as a due process liberty. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521
U.S. 702, 721 (1997) (citations omitted) (quoting Moore v. City of East Cleveland,
431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (plurality opinion); Palko v. Connecticut, 201 U.S. 319,

325 (1937)). Additionally, the Court demanded a "careful description" of the
claimed right. Id. (quoting Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993)). Finally, the
Court implied a restriction to negative-or "freedom from"-rights. See id. at
719-20 (noting that the Due Process Clause protects "against government interference with certain fundamental rights and liberty interests").
226 Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 705-06 (holding that a state law prohibition
against being the "cause" of or providing "aid" to a person attempting suicide is
not a due process clause violation).
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With its roots in the seminal 2003 opinion of Lawrence v.
Texas,2 2 7 Justice Kennedy has incrementally dismantled
Washington v. Glucksberg's limited approach to calibrating
constitutional liberty in the context of gay rights. 2 28 In Lawrence, Kennedy clearly signaled his intentions from the outset
in an opinion striking down a Texas law prohibiting homosexual sodomy. In the first line of the opinion Kennedy wrote,
"Liberty protects the person from unwarranted government intrusions into a dwelling or other private places." 2 2 9 He continued, "Liberty presumes an autonomy of self that includes
freedom of thought, belief, expression, and certain intimate
conduct." 2 3 0 Repudiating the Court's prior decision in the similar case of Bowers v. Hardwick, where the Court upheld a
Georgia law forbidding same-sex sodomy, 2 3 1 Kennedy stated
that the Bowers Court failed "to appreciate the extent of the
liberty at stake." 2 3 2 For Kennedy, the Bowers Court's calibration of the interest at stake as a right to homosexual sodomy
was too narrow, distracting the Court from the fundamental
liberty at stake, namely the right to engage in, and set the
boundaries of, human relationships and intimate conduct
within those relationships. 2 3 3
227 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578-79 (2003) (holding that under the
due process clause a state cannot criminalize consensual intercourse between
two people of the same sex).
228

Scholars consider the set of relevant cases to include at least Windsor,

Lawrence, Bowers v. Hardwick, Obergefell, but potentially reaching back to Loving as the foundational case on marriage. See, e.g., Tribe, supranote 214, at 22,
31 ("The importance of this idea [of constitutional liberty] to Justice Kennedy's
jurisprudence has been most apparent in the gay-rights triptych of Lawrence v.
Texas, United States v. Windsor, and now Obergefell"); Yoshino, supranote 217, at
170 ("In previous cases, such as Lawrence, Casey, and Windsor, [Justice Kennedy] relied heavily on the notion of 'dignity.' While Obergefell makes repeated
reference to dignity, it focuses more on the concept of liberty."); see also Obergefell

v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2602-03 (2015) (expressing the view that liberty and
equality are interconnected); United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2691-96
(2013) (recognizing same-sex marriages where made lawful by the states on prin-

ciples of both federalism and liberty). Compare Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S.
186, 191-92 (1986) (denying protection to same-sex acts under the due process
clause either as a right "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" or as one "deeply
rooted in this Nation's history and tradition"), with Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578-79
(omitting specificity and tradition from due process analysis and explaining that
the Founders had crafted the Constitution to allow future generations to "invoke
its principles in their own search for greater freedom").

229
230

Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562.
Id.

231

478 U.S. at 196.

232

Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567.

233

See id. at 574 ("[Ojur laws and tradition afford constitutional protection to

personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and education.... Persons in a homosexual relationship
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With this, Kennedy signaled that liberty, and the synonymous concept of dignity, 2 3 4 was something more'than a list of
discrete activities. Instead, the constitutional promise of liberty embodies a concept of human good that enables the citizenry to "define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of
the universe, and of the mystery of human life." 2 3 5 By the time
of the Court's decision in Obergefell, then, Kennedy fully embraced the value of constitutional liberty not only as formative
for the scope of investigation of fundamental rights, but as an
end goal in and of itself. As Kennedy noted, "while Lawrence
confirmed a dimension of freedom that allows individuals to
engage in intimate association without criminal liability, it does
not follow that freedom stops there. Outlaw to outcast may be
a step forward, but it does not achieve the full promise of liberty." 2 3 6 Liberty, then, is both formative and conclusory; a
starting point and the goal.
Critically, this transition from liberty as a guide for assessing the means by which the Court determined whether a right
was fundamental under the Fourteenth Amendment to an independent ends against which alleged government infractions
are measured, is mirrored in Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. As noted in Part II, at the time Justice Kennedy joined
the Court, the Eighth Amendment doctrine could best be described as wooden, formalistic, and overly bound to historical

tradition.237
While we have already discussed the Court's incremental
rejection of a narrow and formulaic approach to the Eighth
Amendment in Part II, it is valuable to note here the rhetorical
shift in the jurisprudence after Kennedy's confirmation. What
we see in these cases is an elevation of the value of liberty (or,
as it is sometimes referred to, dignity) in the categorical exemption cases.
This premise of constitutional liberty as guiding the
Court's decision making can be seen overtly in the 2005 case of
Roper v. Simmons. There, Justice Kennedy, writing for the
Court, noted that the drafters of the Constitution included
"broad provisions to secure individual freedom and preserve
may seek autonomy for these purposes, just as heterosexual persons do. The
decision in Bowers would deny them this right.").
234 See, e.g., Tribe, supra note 214, at 17 (analyzing Justice Kennedy's approach to the concept of dignity as it interconnects with rights and equality).
235 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 574 (citing Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey,
505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992)).
236 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2600 (2015).
237 See supranotes 139-53.
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human dignity," amongst those the Eighth Amendment prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments. 2 38 In Roper, the
Court held that while the state is permitted to "exact forfeiture
of some of the most basic liberties" from juvenile offenders
convicted of heinous crimes, the Eighth Amendment places a
restriction upon the government such that "the State cannot
extinguish his life and his potential to attain a mature understanding of his own humanity."2 3 9 Similarly, in Graham v. Florida, in the context of life without parole for a juvenile who
committed a non-homicide offense, the Court again framed the
question in terms of how legislative excess needlessly deprived
the prisoner of the full promise of liberty. There the Court
stated, "The State does not execute the offender sentenced to
life without parole, but the sentence alters the offender's life by
a forfeiture that is irrevocable. It deprives the convict of the
most basic liberties without giving hope of restoration . . . ."240
As the Court in Atkins v. Virginiaexplained, "The basic concept
underlying the Eighth Amendment is nothing less than the
dignity of man." 2

4

1

Drawing on this evolving value of constitutional liberty
(and the synonymous value of dignity), the Court has increasingly undertaken a more expansive assessment of the limits of
legislative imposition of punishment. In Hall v. Florida,Justice
Kennedy noted that through "protecting even those convicted
of heinous crimes, the Eighth Amendment reaffirms the duty of
the government to respect the dignity of all persons." 2 4 2 Put-

ting this principle into action, the Court in Hall reiterated its
holding from Atkins that though intellectually disabled persons
sometimes commit aggravated homicides, "to impose the
harshest of punishments on an intellectually disabled person
violates his or her inherent dignity as a human being." 2 4 3
Importantly for Kennedy, in interpreting the boundaries of
liberty, the line between the liberty "to do" and the liberty to
"not have done to," is not fixed. This "spacious phrase," liberty,
is not fastened to the policies and practices of past generations. 244 Instead, liberty is a concept that continues to unfold
238
239

Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005).
Id. at 573-74.

240

Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 69-70 (2010).

241

Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311 (2002) (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356

U.S. 86, 100 (1958)).
242 Hallv. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986, 1992 (2014) (citingRoper, 543 U.S. at 572).
243

Id.

244 Kennedy Nomination, supranote 25, at 86 (Statement of Anthony M. Kennedy); see also, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2598 (2015) ("The
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in our own time. Justice Kennedy said during his confirmation
hearings that, "what the framers had in mind was to rise above
their own injustices," therefore "[ilt would serve no purpose to
4 5
have a Constitution which simply enacted the status quo." 2
Yet, he went on: "To say that new generations yield new insights and new perspectives does not mean the Constitution
changes. It just means that our understanding of it
changes."2 4 6 Nor does it "mean that moral principles have not
remained the same." 2 4 7 It just means that "it sometimes takes

humans generations to become aware of the moral consequences, or the immoral consequences, of their own
conduct."248

Putting this in the context of the Eighth Amendment, then,
the claims in Atkins and Simmons were not that the Eighth
Amendment barred the execution of juveniles or intellectually
disabled offenders at the time of the Amendment's enactment.
Instead, the claim was that the interconnected liberty and dignity interests that undergird the Amendment are "spacious
phrase[s]" 249 and their full meaning unfolds over time as society learns, grows, and matures. In Kennedy v. Louisiana, Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court, perfectly captured this
concept of evolving liberty: "Evolving standards of decency
must embrace and express respect for the dignity of the person,
2 5 0
and the punishment of criminals must conform to that rule."

Thus, "[i]t is an established principle that decency, in its essence, presumes respect for the individual and thus modera25
tion or restraint in the application of . . . punishment." 1
In other words, with knowledge and experience, society
understands more fully the consequences of its collective actions; to say that the drafters of the Constitution did not intend
generations that wrote and ratified the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment did not presume to know the extent of freedom in all of its dimensions, and
so they entrusted to future generations a charter protecting the right of all persons to enjoy liberty as we learn its meaning."); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558,
578-79 (2003) ("Had those who drew and ratified the Due Process Clauses of the
Fifth Amendment or the Fourteenth amendment known the components of liberty
in its manifold possibilities, they might have been more specific. They did not
presume to have this insight. . . . As the Constitution endures, persons in every
generation can invoke its principles in their own search for greater freedom.").
245 Kennedy Nomination, supra note 25, at 152 (statement of Anthony M.
Kennedy).
246
247

Id. at 230.
Id. at 153.

248

249
250

Id.
Id. at 86 (explaining that such phrases invoke a zone of protection).
Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 420, modified, 554 U.S. 945 (2008).

251

Id. at 435.
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for that experience to be imported into the protections against
liberty misunderstands the enterprise of crafting an enduring
Bill of Rights. The Court made this point powerfully in Hall:
'The Eighth Amendment's protection of dignity reflects the Nation we have been, the Nation we are, and the Nation we aspire
to be. This is to affirm that the Nation's constant, unyielding
purpose must be to transmit the Constitution so that its
precepts and guarantees retain their meaning and force." 2 5 2
Further, it is the role of the judiciary to interpret what the
value of liberty means today as applied to contemporary practices and mores, in light of our historical experience. 2 5 3 It is
the judiciary, then, that must draw that line that demarcates
the outer bounds of liberty; for Justice Kennedy, "[ilt is wavering; it is amorphous; it is uncertain. But this is the judicial
function."2 5 4 As a practical matter, then, "the great question in
constitutional law," according to Justice Kennedy, is: "One,
where is that line drawn? And, two, what are the principles that
you refer to in drawing that line?"2 5 5 Justice Kennedy, during
his confirmation hearing, said that judges should use "history,
the case law, and our understanding of the American constitutional tradition in order to determine the intention of the document broadly expressed," 2 5 6 yet he also agreed with the second
Justice Harlan that this enterprise does not involve "mechanical yardsticks" or "mechanical answers," but rather the exercise of both "judgment and restraint." 2 5 7
In other words, it is the role of the judiciary to guard
against legislative extravagance-to ensure that the laws
passed through the democratic process do not end up "transgressing the constitutional commitment to decency and restraint." 2 58 It is the role of the judiciary both to determine
"whether or not liberty extends to situations not previously
addressed by the courts, to protections not previously announced by the courts"2 5 9 and to gauge whether restrictions on
252

Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986, 1992 (2014).

253
254

See supra subpart I.B.
Kennedy Nomination, supra note 25, at 86 (statement of Anthony M.

Kennedy).
255

Id.
Id.
257 Id. (statement of Sen. Joseph R. Biden, Jr., Chair, S. Comm. on the Judiciary); accordid. (statement of Anthony M. Kennedy) (agreeing with Justice Harlan's
interpretation as posed by then-Senator Biden).
258 Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 420 (2008).
259 Kennedy Nomination, supra note 25, at 87 (statement of Anthony M.
Kennedy).
256
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liberty-particularly in the context of punishment-remain
necessary in kind and degree.
Justice Kennedy believes this approach "is consistent with
the idea that constitutional values are intended to endure from
generation to generation and from age to age." 2 6 0 As Justice
Kennedy has noted,
It was not the political branches of the government that decided Brown v. Board of Education. It was not the political
branches of the government that wrought the resolution of
Baker v. Carr, the apportionment decision, or that decided
the right of counsel case in Gideon v. Wainwright. It was the
6
courts. 2 1

This is an approach that places the judiciary at the heart of
understanding and preserving liberty as a stable moral concept
that progresses in its particular demands over time. For Justice Kennedy, the drafters of the Constitution meant for the
document to apply to "exigencies and circumstances and perhaps even crises that they could never foresee." 2 6 2 This does
not mean that judges are free to import their own values or
biases to resolve constitutional disputes. "This is not the aristocracy of the robe," then-Judge Kennedy cautioned during his
confirmation hearings. 2 6 3 "Judges are not to make laws; they
are to enforce the laws." 2 6 4 Instead, "the idea is that the Constitution is itself a law," "[ilt is a document that must be followed." 2 6 5 And thus, "judges must be bound by some neutral,
definable, measurable standard in their interpretation of the
Constitution." 2 6 6 The standard that has emerged is liberty.
With this understanding of the Court's fundamental shift
to, and embracing of, the value of constitutional liberty, and its
role in driving the doctrinal shifts in both the Eighth Amendment and substantive due process clause, we turn now to highlight two specific lessons from the Court's most recent
substantive due process decision-Obergefell. As suggested
above, given the symbiotic borrowing between these two proviId. at 140.
Id. at 100 (statement of Senator Edward M. Kennedy, Member, S. Comm.
on the Judiciary) (quoting from a 1978 speech by Anthony M. Kennedy).
262
Id. at 139 (statement of Anthony M. Kennedy).
263
Id. at 138.
264
Id.
265
Id. at 140.
266
Id. at 138. Fittingly, then, Professor Michael Dorf, a former Kennedy clerk,
said of the Justice that he is "probably the most confident of all the justices in the
court's power." HELEN J. KNOWLES, THE TIE GOES TO FREEDOM: JUSTICE ANTHONY M.
KENNEDY ON LIBERTY 5 (2009) (quoting Richard Brust, The Man in the Middle, 89
A.B.A. J. 24, 25 (2003)).
260
261
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sions, these observations are instructive for the Court's potential vision of a robust Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.
First. In Part II, we described how the Court has taken a
more functional approach to gauging societal norms in the
most recent Eighth Amendment cases. For example, the Court
has gauged actual sentencing practice, the level of geographic
isolation that the punishment reflects, 2 6 7 and whether a state
that retains a punishment is nonetheless "de facto" abolitionist
due to a combination of long-term and prospective disuse (the
latter of which, in Hall, was signaled by gubernatorial imposed
moratoria on executions). 2 6 8 Yet, in the context of the substantive due process clause, the Court takes an even more sophisticated approach to assessing societal standards of decency. In
Obergefell the Court stated:
There have been referenda, legislative debates, and grassroots campaigns, as well as countless studies, papers, books,
and other popular and scholarly writings. There has been
extensive litigation in state and federal courts. Judicial opinions addressing the issue have been informed by the contentions of parties and counsel, which, in turn, reflect the more
general, societal discussion of same-sex marriage and its
meaning that has occurred over the past decades. As more
than 100 amici make clear in their filings, many of the central
institutions in American life-state and local governments,
the military, large and small businesses, labor unions, religious organizations, law enforcement, civic groups, professional organizations, and universities-have devoted
substantial attention to the question. This has led to an
enhanced understanding of the issue-an understanding reflected in the arguments now presented for resolution as a
matter of constitutional law.2 6 9

Through the lens of Obergefell the function of consulting
objective indicia begins to look like the equivalent of civil discovery. The Court is drawing on a broader set of information
from a more diverse set of sources. This, then, arguably provides the Court with a greater opportunity to detect whether its
own intuitions on the question of excessive punishment adequately reflect the tapestry of norms that comprise the current
standards of decency.
Specifically, though, as we discuss in Part IV, this broader
conception of the appropriate sources for the Court to consult
See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 62-64 (2010).
See Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986, 1997 (2014).
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2605 (2015) (internal citation
omitted).
267
268
269
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could prove illuminative in cases, unlike the death penalty,
where the punishments the Court confronts does not benefit
from juror (or even judicial) input. 2 70 In those cases, for example in the context of mandatory minimum sentences or extreme
prison conditions, these sources could help to guard against
increasingly subjective judgment on the one hand or forced
inaction on the other.
Second. The right to marry has been at the core of substantive due process jurisprudence since the Court's 1967 decision in Loving v. Virginia.2 7 1 In Obergefell, Justice Kennedy,
writing for the Court, focuses on the inequality of permitting
one type of couple the dignity to marry (for instance, the interracial couple in Loving) while denying that right to another type
of couple (same-sex couples). 2 7 2 However, the Court did not
perform a separate equal protection analysis to give substance
to the inequality concerns. Instead, in a move that Professor
Tribe refers to as the creation of the "equal dignity" doctrine,2 7 3
Justice Kennedy simply explained:
The Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause are
connected in a profound way, though they set forth independent principles. Rights implicit in liberty and rights secured
by equal protection may rest on different precepts and are
not always co-extensive, yet in some instances each may be
instructive as to the meaning and reach of the other. In any
particular case one Clause may be thought to capture the
essence of the right in a more accurate and comprehensive
way, even as the two Clauses may4 converge in the identifica27
tion and definition of the right.
This equal dignity concept is incredibly important in the
context of the Eighth Amendment. For instance, while executing an intellectually disabled person would violate his "inherent
See infra subpart IV.B.
See 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) ("Marriage is one of the basic civil rights of man,
fundamental to our very existence and survival.... The Fourteenth Amendment
requires that the freedom of choice to marry not be restricted by invidious racial
discriminations. Under our Constitution, the freedom to marry, or not marry, a
person of another race resides with the individual and cannot be infringed by the
State." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
272
Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2601-02 ("As the State itself makes marriage all
the more precious by the significance it attaches to it, exclusion from that status
has the effect of teaching that gays and lesbians are unequal in important respects. . . . The limitation of marriage to opposite-sex couples may long have
seemed natural and just, but its inconsistency with the central meaning of the
fundamental right to marry is now manifest." (citations omitted)).
273 Tribe, supra note 214, at 17.
274
Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2602-03.
270
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dignity as a human being," 2 7 5 states routinely execute people
with similar (or more severe) functional impairments. 276 Or,
when the Court considers the ability of juveniles to transform
their lives and become productive members of society, the concept of equal dignity might call for consideration of whether the
same logic compels the Court to reckon with the ability of
adults who are drug-addicted or severely mentally ill, for example, to change over time as their conditions change. The point
is not that these inequalities suggest an Equal Protection
Clause violation, but rather that the flexibility to observe these
inequities is not irrelevant to the question of whether a broad
punishment practice violates the Constitution.
The import of these observations coupled with our evaluation in Part II of the continuing trajectory of the Eighth Amendment doctrine under the emerging constitutional liberty
principle has significance for the future of criminal justice in
America. Part IV assesses the future of the Eighth Amendment
and the impact of constitutional liberty on contemporary issues in criminal law and procedure.
IV
LOOKING AHEAD: LIBERTY AND THE MODERNIZATION OF
CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN AMERICA

This Part turns to consider both the possibilities and limitations of Eighth Amendment constitutional liberty. To that
end, in subpart A we sketch the near-term trajectory of constitutional liberty on three contemporary-and critical-areas of
criminal justice: life without parole for juvenile homicide offenders, life without parole for non-violent drug offenders, and
the death penalty. In mapping a trajectory of the Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence, our goal is not to predict the outcome of any particular challenge to a punishment practice, or
even to argue that any particular practice is unconstitutional.
Rather, our goal is simply to show where the Court's recent
Eighth Amendment doctrinal moves could lead at a concrete
level. In doing so, we aim to anticipate some of the practical
and doctrinal challenges that the Court may face as it continues to flesh out its burgeoning Eighth Amendment liberty
jurisprudence.
275

Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986, 1992 (2014).

276

See CHARLES HAMILTON HOUSTON INST. FOR RACE & JUST., 2015 CHHIRJ

DEATH PENALTY REPORT [hereinafter CHHIRJ REPORT] (providing accounts of people

with functional impairments who were executed in 2015).
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Subsequently, in subpart B, we consider the future implications for-and potential limitations of-our exegesis, beyond
the doctrinal hubs discussed in subpart A. First, we consider
the impact on the doctrine in cases where actual usage data is
skewed by the absence of ajury or judge finding because of, for
example, mandatory minimum sentences. Second, we consider how the doctrine might respond to a challenged punishment practice, for instance the use of solitary confinement as a
punishment for juveniles, where decision makers do make discretionary choices, but those choices are neither neutral nor
transparent. In the context of the solitary confinement discussion, we wrestle with the thorny question of what the Court
should do when it has imperfect information about a punishment practice. On the one hand, the Court has an obligation to
curb retributive excess. On the other hand, in relying on its
own judgment without strong confirmation from objective
markers of societal standards of decency, the Court risks getting the calculation wrong-and, more fundamentally, damaging is institutional credibility.
A.

Reinventing the Eighth Amendment
1.

Life Without Parolefor Juvenile Homicide Offenders

The first area where Eighth Amendment constitutional liberty potentially has an impact is life without parole for juvenile
homicide offenders. Meet Taurus Buchanan. Now nearly forty,
he is serving life without the possibility of parole for a single
punch that he threw as a sixteen-year-old boy during a street
fight. 2 7 7 Earlier this year, the prosecutor who sent him to
prison said: "I think I went too far. If the state of Louisiana lets
him out, I would fall on my knees and thank God." 2 78 Hillary
Clinton, too, recently apologized for using the term "superpredator" to refer to child offenders back in the 1990s. 2 7 9 Despite these apologies, though, the panic that swirled around
the nation-in the media, from the mouths of public intellectuals and politicians, in the minds of ordinary Americans-had a
considerable impact on sentencing laws. 28 0 John Mills, Anna
Dorn, and Amelia Hritz have explained that concern over the
violence that the new breed of superpredator would unleash on
277
Corey G. Johnson & Ken Armstrong, This Boy's Life, THE MARSHALL PROJECT, (Jan. 4, 2016), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2016/01/04/this-boy-

s-life#.cm0Dvp5Cp [https://perma.cc/G5B4-AXC7].
278

Id.

279
280

See Lachman, supra note 72.
See supra Part I.
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Americans led "forty-five states [to] adopt[ ] laws expanding the
jurisdiction of adult courts over juveniles, thereby expanding
the applicability of JLWOP." 28 1 Even as violent crime decreased in the 1990s, juvenile life without parole sentences
increased. 28 2 The rhetoric-the moral panic-and not reality
drove the legislative response and its retributive overreach. 28 3
Under the theory of constitutional liberty, and the rightsprotective role the Court is establishing for itself under the
Eighth Amendment, what result? It turns out that the objective indicators of societal standards of decency illuminate the
rarity and geographic concentration of juvenile life without parole sentences. While only sixteen states bar life without the
possibility of parole sentences for juveniles who commit murder (and thirty-five states permit this punishment), nine states
have abandoned the punishment in the past four years-a
striking number given that the net effect of these changes is to
reduce punishment, not taxes. 28 4 In terms of actual usage of
the punishment, fourteen states that retain life without parole
for juveniles have five or fewer people serving the punishment
statewide, 28 5 and in six of those states, no person is serving the
sentence.2 8 6 Five additional states have imposed either zero or
one life without parole sentences upon a juvenile since

281
MILLS ET. AL, supranote 56, at 4-5. But see John R. Mills et al., Juvenile
Life Without Parole in Law and Practice: Chronicling the Rapid Change Underway,
65 AM. U. L. REV. 535, 560 (2016) (detailing legislative enactments and declining
usage of juvenile life without parole).
282
Mills, supranote 281, at 560 (noting the superpredator era "saw a marked
increase in juvenile life without parole (JLWOP) sentences, despite a drop after
1994 in homicides committed by juveniles."); id. at 561 fig. 1. (citing Easy Access
to the FBI's Supplementary Homicide Reports: 1980-2013, OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION (2015), http://www.oijdp.gov/ojstatbb/ezash
[https://perma.cc/V6NU-3C6A] (providing year over year data on homicides and
homicides by juvenile offenders)).
283
See suprasubpart I.A.
284
MILLS, supranote 56, at 4-5 (detailing legislative enactments). The Massachusetts Supreme Court held that juvenile life without parole violated their state
constitution. See Diatchenko v. Dist. Att'y, 1 N.E. 3d 270, 284-85 (Mass. 2013).
Delaware enacted a law that provides juveniles serving life without parole the
right to petition for a sentence reduction. See An Act to Amend Tile 11 of the
Delaware Code Relating to Criminal Sentences, 2013 Del. Laws 37 (2013). Thus,
in practical effect, there is no life without parole left in Delaware. The other seven
states eliminated the punishment outright through their respective state legislatures. MILLS, supra note 56, at 4-5.
285
Mills, supra note 281, at 603-04 app. B (listing Idaho, Iowa, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, South Dakota, and Utah).
286
Id. (listing Indiana, Maine, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, and Rhode
Island).
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2011.287 This decreased usage exemplifies the extreme geo-

graphic isolation. As scholars have recently noted, "[t]hree
counties, which represent 4.1% of the U.S. population, are responsible for over twenty percent of all sentences." 2 88
As we have noted throughout this Article, these factors
matter because they create a strong inference that life without
parole does not meaningfully contribute to legitimate retributive demand. 28 9 This is because if life without parole did serve
a legitimate retributive function then we would expect that the
punishment would be used routinely instead of rarely, and
broadly instead of in isolated instances.
Further, a closer look at the relationship between the punishment and the goal of retribution reveals deep conflict. First,
children under eighteen possess diminished culpability relative
to a typically-developed adult. 290 Juveniles "struggle to define
their identity," possess a "susceptibility" to "immature and irresponsible behavior," and have a "vulnerability and comparative
lack of control over their immediate surroundings." 2 9 1 Given
that life without parole is the second harshest punishment
available under law, 2 9 2 the unmistakable severity of the sentence relative to the diminished moral culpability of juveniles
helps to explain why, as the moral panic over super-predators
fizzled, most of the nation walked away from the punishment.
Another reason why juvenile life without parole raises serious questions about its retributive excess is because people
change, often dramatically. 293 Last term, in Montgomery v.
Louisiana, Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court, reiterated
that a sentence of life without parole is extravagant for all but
"the rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects irreparable corruption." 2 9 4 So, the only time where a life without parole sen287 Id. at 575 n.233 (listing Alabama, Arkansas, Iowa, Maryland, and
Minnesota).
288
Id. at 571; see also Beth Schwartzapfel, Life Without Parole:For Juveniles, 5
Tough Counties, THE MARSHALL PROJECT (Sept. 22 2015), https://
www.themarshallproject.org/2015/09/22/life-without-parole-for-juveniles-5tough-counties#.jypg2S9ql [https://perna.cc/VK8P-4PY2] (discussing sentencing inequities between counties).
289
See supraParts I & II.
290
See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 570-71 (2005).
291
Id. at 570.
292
Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 996 (1991).
293
See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 68 (2010) ("Juveniles are more capable
of change than are adults, and their actions are less likely to be evidence of
'irretrievably depraved character' than are the actions of adults." (quoting Roper,
543 U.S. at 570)).
294
Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 734 (2016) (quoting Miller v.
Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2469 (2012).
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tence is retributively justified is in the case of a juvenile who is
irreparably corrupt. But how is it possible to know whether a
thirteen-year-old child is irreparably corrupt? The best time to
make that determination is years-or even decades-after the
offense when the decision can be made on the basis of lived
experience. Thus, life without parole appears to be excessive,
in part, because it denies the hope of redemption. As Justice
Kennedy articulated in Graham v. Florida:
[Life without parole] deprives the convict of the most basic
liberties without giving hope of restoration, except perhaps
by executive clemency-the remote possibility of which does
not mitigate the harshness of the sentence. As one court
observed in overturning a life without parole sentence for a
juvenile defendant, this sentence "means denial of hope; it
means that good behavior and character improvement are
immaterial; it means that whatever the future might hold in
store for the mind and spirit of the convict, he will remain in
prison for the rest of his days." 2 9 5
2.

Life Without Parolefor Nonviolent Drug Offenders

We see similar patterns of moral panic, legislative reaction,
and consequent retributive overreach in the category of life
without parole for non-violent drug offenders. As we discussed
in Part I, the moral panic surrounding drug use in the 1980s
and 1990s was high. 2 9 6 Former Republican House Speaker
Newt Gingrich recently stated, "I was hardcore on the issue of
crime . . . [tihere were tremendous unintended consequences.
Locking up people for very minor drug offenses destroyed their
future." 2 9 7 As Professors Bidish Sarma and Sophie Cull have
explained, like Gingrich, many Americans were "hardcore" on
the issue of drug crime; and, similar to juvenile life without
parole, most of the state and federal laws that resulted in life
without parole for drug offenses were enacted during a moral
panic. 2 9 8 At the time, the public ranked crime as the number
295
Graham, 560 U.S. at 69-70 (2010) (quoting Naovarath v. State, 779 P. 2d
944 (Nev. 1989) (citation and alterations omitted)).
296
Supra notes 57-61 and accompanying text (describing the fear regarding
the crack-cocaine epidemic).
297
Steven Rosenfeld, Will the Strange Bedfellow Team of Van Jones and Newt
GingrichPush Congress to Reverse Decades of CriminalJusticeand PrisonPolicy?,
ALTERNET (Jun. 7, 2015), http://www.alternet.org/civil-liberties/will-strange[http://
bedfellow-team-van-Jones-and-newt-gingrich-push-congress-reverse
perma.cc/CR95-UMAW].
See Bidish Sarma & Sophie Cull, The Emerging EighthAmendment Consen298
sus Against Life Without Parole Sentences for Nonviolent Offenses, 66 CASE W.L.
REv. 525, 540-543 (2015). In 1984, Congress passed a law that eliminated parole
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one issue in America. 2 9 9 The hysteria centered on the perception that drugs and violence were deeply interconnected.3 0 0
As it turns out, as in the case of juvenile life without parole
for homicide offenses, the perception on the interrelatedness of
drugs and violence, albeit popular, does not enjoy the advantage of veracity.3 0 1 Again, panic, not reality, drove the retributive overreach. Recognizing this fact, Senators Ted Cruz (R)
and Corey Booker (D), among others, have introduced the
Smarter Sentencing Act, which would eliminate in practice life
without parole for non-violent drug offense prospectively by
creating a safety valve through which judges could reduce life
sentences. 3 0 2 That legislation, which enjoys broad bipartisan
support (though not the support of the committee chair), is still
pending as of September 2016.3o3 Meanwhile, two-thirds of
state legislatures have reduced the punishments for various
drug offenses,3 0 4 a fact that captures the broad societal underfor people serving a life sentence. See Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No.
98-473, 98 Stat. 2019, 2069 (1987) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
18 U.S.C. and 28 U.S.C.). New or expanded federal laws came in '86, '87, and '94.
See U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984: PrincipalFea-

tures, http://www.ussc.gov/research-and-publications/working-group-reports/
simplification/simplification-draft-paper-2 [https://perma.ce/4KAL-AR4Y].
299
See OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CRITICAL CRIMINAL
JUSTICE ISSUES: TASK FORCE REPORTS FROM THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF CRIMINOLOGY TO

ATTORNEY GENERAL JANET RENO vii (1995), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/

158837.pdf [https://perma.cc/X3BJ-AG6J]; see also Jeffrey M. Jones, Americans
PerceiveIncreased Crime in U.S., GALLUP (Oct. 14, 2009), http://www.gallup.com/
poll/ 123644/americans-perceive-increased-crime.aspx [https://perma.cc/PJ8L9P7C] (reporting on polling data showing respondents believed crime is
increasing).
300 See Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 146 (2008) ("As suggested by its
title, the Armed Career Criminal Act focuses upon the special danger created
when a particular type of offender-a violent criminal or drug trafficker-possesses a gun."); see also Roper Ctr. for Pub. Op. Research, What Accounts for High
Rates of Crime?, THE PUBLIC PERSPECTIVE, June/July 1997, at 14 (1997), https://

ropercenter.cornell.edu/public-perspective/ppscan/84/84014.pdf [https://
perma.cc/B6HQ-Y3K9] (showing a majority of poll respondents in 1989 and 1990
believed drugs were the leading cause of crime).
301 See, e.g., Shima Baradaran, Drugs and Violence, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 227,
227 (2015) (explaining that there is no "causal connection between drugs and
violence" that appears in "historical arrest data, current research, or independent
empirical evidence").
302
See 161 Cong. Rec. S. 1576, 1577 (daily ed. Mar. 17, 2015) (statement of
Sen. Lee); see also id. at 1578 (statement of Sen. Durbin) (detailing how this
legislation would reduce, but not eliminate, a number of the mandatory minimum
sentences and also provide remedies for people sentenced under the old 100:1
powder-crack regime).
303
See S. 502: Smarter Sentencing Act of 2015, GOVTRACK.Us, https://
www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/ 1 14/s502 [https://perma.cc/3EKU-BBX2].
304 See generally Ram Subramanian & Rebecka Moreno, VERA INST. OF JUSTICE,
DRUG WAR DE'TENTE? A REVIEW OF STATE-LEVEL DRUG LAW REFORM, 2009-2013 5-23

(2014) (surveying state legislation changing drug laws).
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standing of drug-war overreach and the subsequent energy
and success around measures enacted to reduce the severity of
punishment.
All told, twenty-two states and the federal government authorize life without parole for non-violent drug offenses.3 05 But
the real indicator of abandonment, as explained in Graham, is
the sheer disuse of the punishment practice.3 06 As a conservative estimate, there are over 1.5 million arrests for drug crimes
in the United States each year.30 7 Thus, over the course of
16.4 years (the median number of years served by a person
currently serving life without parole for a non-violent offense3 0 ), nearly twenty-five million people were arrested for
drug crimes. Meanwhile, in the entire country, there are approximately 2,500 people serving life without parole for a nonviolent drug crime.30 9 Hence, the rarity of the sanction reflects
strongly the improbability that permanent imprisonment as a
punishment practice meaningfully serves a retributive purpose. These comparatively few sentences are highly concentrated at the state level. While approximately 80% of life
without parole sentences for non-violent drug offenses occur at
the federal level, there are people serving life without parole for
drug offenses in as few as eight and as many as eleven
states.3 10
Oklahoma, the Republican governor recently signed into law a bill that reduces
the severity of mandatory life without parole for a third non-violent drug possession (called trafficking) offense. See Justice Safety Valve Act, 2015 Okla. Sess.
Laws 243.
305
Sarma & Cull, supra note 298, at 561; see also JENNIFER TURNER & WILL
BUNTING, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, A LIVING DEATH: LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE FOR NONVIOLENT OFFENSES 23 fig.3 (2013) (displaying a map of the states that authorize life

without parole for non-violent offenses).
306
See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 62-63 (2010) (explaining the extreme
rarity of juvenile life without parole for non-homicide offenses relative to the
availability of the punishment); see also supranotes 195-205 and accompanying
text (describing the Court's emphasis on actual sentences usage for curbing retributive excess).
307
See Crime, Arrests, and US Law Enforcement, DRUGWARFACTS.ORG, http://
www.drugwarfacts.org/cms/crime#sthash.qqM6xBdC.dpbs [https://perma.ce/
5RGZ-5FWH] (reporting annual drug arrests range from 1,501,043-1,841,182
between 2007 and 2014); Drugs and Crime Facts, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
http://www.bjs.gov/content/dcf/enforce.cfm [https://perma.cc/Z429-E8HZ
(reporting approximately 1,841,200 drug arrests in 2007).
308
TURNER & BUNTING, supra note 305, at 26.
309
Id. at 23 tbl.3.
310
Id. (listing Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Louisiana, Mississippi,
Oklahoma, and South Carolina. It is possible that there are people serving life
without parole in Delaware, Nevada or Virginia, but the Departments of Corrections in those locations did not respond adequately to public records requests).
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The Death Penalty

A third punishment regime that could be implicated by the
Court's emerging approach to the Eighth Amendment is the
death penalty. After the Court invalidated then-existing capital
3 1 1 thirty-five legislapunishment statutes in 1972 in Furrnan,
tures across the country enacted new death penalty regimes
with impressive speed and ferocity. 3 12 The American Law Institute drafted a model statute that served as the dominant inspiration for modem capital punishment statutes.3 13 In Gregg,
the Court considered these developments "[tihe most marked
indication of society's endorsement of the death penalty for
murder." 3 14
It is important to note the timing of the Furman decision
when trying to understand this backlash. Furman came one
year after the Court's decision mandating bussing, 3 15 and a
year prior to its decision in Roe v. Wade, declaring a woman's
right to an abortion.3 1 6 Facilitated by Furman, the death penalty became the mechanism for a proxy war on deep racial, 3 17
cultural,3 18 and federalism concerns. 3 19 In this way then, the
trajectory of capital punishment resembles the aftermath of a
moral panic. Significant societal anger and fear translated into
legislative (re)enactment of the death penalty. Yet, even in its
heyday in the 1990s, Americans never truly used the death
penalty regularly. Indeed, at its peak, Americans only sen-

Missouri used to be on this list, but the Governor granted the last person serving
life without parole clemency in 2015.
311
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239-40 (1972).
312
See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 179-80, 179 n.23 (1976) (listing the
states and explaining that the American people had spoken as to the desirability
of the death penalty).
313
Id. at 191 (describing the model penal code statute upon which the Georgia
statute was modeled).
314
Id. at 179.
315
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 29-30 (1971).
316
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 166 (1973).
317
See Steven E. Barkan & Steven F. Cohn, Racial Prejudice and Supportfor
the Death Penalty by Whites, 31 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 202, 205 (1994) (reporting on results of empirical study that show "[w]hite support for the death penalty
is . . . associated with antipathy to Blacks and racial stereotyping").
318
See Lauren Gambino, Democrats' Divide on Death Penalty Emerges as a
Major Point of Difference, THE GuARDIN (Nov. 6, 2015 8:43 PM), https://www.the
guardian.com/us-news/2015/nov/06/democrats-death-penalty-clinton-san
ders-omalley [https://perma.cc/XMT7-7QCGl.
319
See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 378-79 (2000) (addressing deference
owed to state courts in post-conviction capital proceedings).
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tenced 300-350 people to death each year in a nation that
endures 10,000 to 15,000 annual homicides.3 2 0
Today, nineteen states have formally abandoned the death
penalty through legislation (seventeen states) or judicial decision (two states). 3 2 1 As with juvenile life without parole, under
the old mode of detecting consensus, the fact that thirty-one
states and the federal government authorize the punishment
would be fatal to any Eighth Amendment challenge. But under
the more functional assessment that the Court has begun to
employ to legislative trends, actual usage and geographic isolation render the death penalty constitutionally suspect.
Since 2007, seven states have formally eliminated capital
punishment. 3 2 2 No state that previously prohibited capital
punishment has enacted it in over twenty years. Governors in
Oregon, Colorado, Washington and Pennsylvania have used
their executive discretion to bar executions while they remain
in office. Oregon counted on the abolitionist "side of the ledger"
in Hall v. Floridabecause the state had "suspended the death
penalty and executed only two individuals in the past 40
years." 3 2 3 Meanwhile, similar to Oregon, Colorado has executed only one person since Gregg.3 24 Washington has executed only five people in that time. And Pennsylvania has
executed only three people-all volunteers. 3 2 5 Other states exhibit similar types of long-term disuse, though without formal
moratoria. For example, eleven states plus the federal government performed five or fewer executions since Gregg,3 2 6 including two states that have not executed anyone. 3 2 7 Justice
320

See FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES tbl.4

(2014), https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2014/crime-in-the-u.s.-2014/ta

bles/table-4 [https://perma.cc/AG5T-XQZU].
321

See Facts About the Death Penalty, Death Penalty Info. Ctr. (July 15, 2016)

(listing states); 31 States with the Death Penalty and 19 States with DeathPenalty
Bans, PROCON.ORG (Aug. 9, 2016, 3:20 PM), http://deathpenalty.procon.org/
view.resource.php?resourcelD=00 1172 [https://perma.cc/YV9M-ELCE].
322
Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2774 (Breyer, J., dissenting). New Jersey (2007), New
York (2007), New Mexico (2009), Illinois (2011), Connecticut (2012), Maryland

(2013), and Nebraska (2015).
323

134 S. Ct. 1986, 1997 (2014).
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FACTS ABOUT THE DEATH PENALTY, supra note 321.
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Id.; see also Pennsylvania, DEATH PENALTY INFO CTR., http://deathpenalty

info.org/pennsylvania- 1 #sent [https://perma.cc/LU42-AYEQ] (noting that Pennsylvania's three post-Gregg executions "have all been volunteers with serious
mental health issues, whom courts found to have waived their rights to an appeals process").
326

FAcTS ABoUT THE DEATH PENALTY, supra note 321.

327

See Executions by State and Year, DEATH PENALTY INFO CTR., http://

www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/node/5741
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Breyer counted thirty-nine states overall that exhibit long-term
disuse or else have formally eliminated the death-penalty. 3 2 8
Moreover, both death sentences and executions have declined sharply over the past twenty years. In 2015, only fortynine new death sentences were imposed nationally, an all-time
post-Furman low. 3 2 9 In Texas, the number of death sentences
fell from forty-eight in 1999 to nine in 2013 to two in 2015.
Dramatic declines hit the Deep South as a whole. Indeed, over
the past decades, death sentence and execution averages dipped significantly below the levels of the decade before Furman,
causing Justice White to conclude that when, as it had in
1972, "imposition of the penalty reaches a certain degree of
infrequency, it would be very doubtful that any existing general
need for retribution would be measurably satisfied."3 3 0 Moreover, in terms of geographic isolation, in Glossip, Justice Breyer
emphasized that "the number of active death penalty counties
is small and getting smaller."3 3 1 Since 2010, Breyer noted,
"only 15 counties imposed five or more death sentences." 3 3 2
Thus, examined at the more granular level that has
marked the Court's recent Eighth Amendment cases, over 3000
counties no longer use the death penalty while only 15 counties
333
nationally averaged at least one death sentence per year.
When viewed together with the reality that 31 states either
formally eliminated the death penalty or else have performed
less than one execution per decade since Gregg, it becomes
difficult to argue that the death penalty meaningfully contributes to a need for retribution.
If one shifts the lens from societal standards to the reality
of the death penalty in practice, the relationship between capital punishment and retribution is murkier still. The typical
person who commits a murder is not, according to the Court,
eligible for a death sentence.3 3 4 To be death-eligible, a person
328 Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2773 (2015) (counting nineteen abolitionist states, eleven states that retain the death penalty but have not executed

anyone since 2006, and nine states that have conducted fewer than five executions since 2006, which makes "an execution in those states a fairly rare event").
329 Death Sentences in the United States from 1977 by State and by Year,
DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CTR. (2016), http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/death-

sentences-united-states-1977-2008 Ihttps://perma.cc/A9G6-C59H} [hereinafter
Death Sentences in the U.S.].
330 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 311 (White, J., concurring).
331
Glossip, 135 S. Ct., at 2774 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
332

333
334

Id.
Id.
See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 319 (2002) (explaining that "[i]f the

culpability of the average murderer is insufficient to justify the most extreme

478

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 102:413

must possess sufficient moral culpability; i.e. more than that of
the typically developing adult. Additionally, the Court held
that the Eighth Amendment bars the execution of juveniles
(more impulsive, less formed identity, susceptible to external
influence from peers, etc.)3 3 5 and the intellectually disabled
("cognitive and behavioral impairments" that include "the diminished ability to understand and process information, to
learn from experience, to engage in logical reasoning, or to
control impulses") due to their significantly diminished moral
culpabilities.3 3 6 Indeed, as the Court reiterated in Hall, "to
impose the harshest of punishments on an intellectually disabled person violates his or her inherent dignity as a human
being."3 3 7 In other words, the punishment of death is so retributively askew that its imposition would violate the inherent
dignity that government must preserve even when the offender
committed a serious crime.
Unfortunately, putting a wall around juveniles and the intellectually disabled has not solved the problem of executing
people with crippling impairments. In 2015 alone roughly 75%
of executions involved a concern over retributive excess due to
intellectual impairments, brain damage, severe mental illness,
and other similarly serious impairments.3 3 8 Consider one example: Georgia executed Andrew Brannan, a decorated Vietnam combat veteran who had been diagnosed with both posttraumatic stress disorder and bipolar disorder. His symptoms
included depression, hypomania, flashbacks, recurrent intense anxiety, and paranoia.3 3 9 His "total occupation and social impairment" led the Department of Veteran Affairs to
categorize him as 100% disabled.3 4 0
Finally, the death penalty eliminates both any hope of
transformation and any reason to believe that the prisoner has
intrinsic value. But the reality is that even people on death row
sanction available to the State, the lesser culpability of the mentally retarded
offender surely does not merit that form of retribution").
3s5
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569-70 (2005) (barring the death penalty
for juvenile offenders).
336 Atkins, 536 U.S. at 320 (barring the death penalty for intellectually disabled offenders).
337 Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986, 1992 (2014).
338 CHHIRJ REPoRT, supra note 276 (describing the credible mitigation evidence for each execution in 2015).
339 Franklin J. Bordenave & D. Clay Kelly, The DeathPenalty and Mentally Ill
Defendants, 38 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 284, 285 (2010).
340 Taylor Barnes, A Vietnam Veteran with PTSD is the First US Execution of
2015, INTERCEPT (Jan. 14, 2015), https://theintercept.com/2015/01/14/vietnam
-veteran-ptsd-first-us-execution-2015/ [https://perma.cc/LB3T-V2P9].
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change. Consider, as one recent example, Kelly Gissendaner, a
woman who, while in prison awaiting execution, had mentored
despondent prisoners, many of who then became productive
members of society when released, including women who are
now social workers and literacy teachers. "Kelly is the poster
child for redemption," one of those women said. "Killing Kelly is
essentially killing hope."3 4 1
When executing people with marked functional impairments or the demonstrated capacity to change becomes the
rule, not the exception, an Obergefell-esque concern over equal
dignity emerges to cast further doubt on the retributive necessity of the capital punishment enterprise as a whole.

As this subpart illustrates, once the strands of a more
robust Eighth Amendment jurisprudence are identified, three
harsh punishment practices become vulnerable to constitutional attack, even in a short-term view of the doctrine's trajectory. By envisioning in concrete terms the contours of potential
Eighth Amendment challenges under the newly robust categorical exemption approach, a few important facts emerge. First,
plausibly excessive punishments tend to be geographically isolated at the state and county level. These sanctions also tend
to be used very rarely relative to their availability. Taken together, these insights provide a critical rebuff to those scholars
who envision that departure from the "modes of punishment"
or "contrary to longstanding practice" approaches would result
in a hopelessly subjective enterprise too sensitive to momentary trends in opinion.3 4 2 While these critiques have merit
under a wooden approach that simply counts state legislatures, the same arguments lose much of their force under the
Court's more robust look into societal standards of decency,
including, importantly, evidence of how, where, when, and how
often local actors use their discretion to seek and impose the
challenged punishment practice.

341 FormerInmates Pleadfor Clemency for Kelly Gissendaner,Who Gave Them
Hope in Prison, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., http://deathpenaltyinfo.org/node/6254
[https://perma.cc/4M2J-JWGP].
342 See, e.g., Stinneford, supranote 3, at 554-55 (noting the problem of interpreting standards of decency based upon consensus over decades as opposed to
centuries).
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Tensions and Possible Limitations

In this subpart, we briefly outline the possible tensions for,
and limitations of, Eighth Amendment constitutional liberty.
The chief uncertainty that remains centers on how the Court
detects retributive excess. To preview those tensions, we first
query what happens when actual sentencing data, which thus
far has relied heavily on the joint discretion of prosecutors and
jurors, is unavailable due to mandatory minimum sentences
that remove discretion from juries and judges. Second, using
the context of solitary confinement, an area where Justice Kennedy has showed express interest, we explore how the doctrine
should react to usage data that is obscured both by a lack of
participation by neutral parties like judges or juries and a fundamental lack of transparency. These decisions-are made, literally, behind the prison walls. Relatedly, and finally, this
section hypothesizes insufficient information to detect societal
consensus with certainty and describes some advantages and
disadvantages of the Court invalidating a punishment practice
with a heavier reliance on its own judgment that the punishment is excessive or through the consultation of a broader set
of indicators, such as the markers of democratic discourse that
the Court consulted in Obergefell.
1.

When the Typical Usage IndicatorsAre Unavailable:
Mandatory Minimum Sentences

One of the most promising doctrinal developments in the
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence has been the move to a more
functional assessment of societal standards of decency. Specifically, the move from a focus on bean counting legislative
enactments to a focus on the actual usage of a punishment
permits a more fine-tuned understanding of decency because it
involves not abstract policy considerations, but rather real
cases with real facts decided by local jurors or judges. One
tension of the categorical exemption framework, however, is
that many different crimes carry mandatory minimum
sentences of varying degrees, which skews the assessment of
decency that comes from on-the-ground discretionary decisions in individual cases.3 4 3
In Miller v. Alabama, the Court held that the Eighth
Amendment prohibits automatic life without parole sentences
for juveniles who commit homicide offenses.3 44 Thus, a juve343
344

See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2474-75 (2012).
Id. at 2475.
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nile homicide offender has the right to present evidence that
suggests that he is not "irreparably corrupt[ ]" and therefore
suggests that a life without parole sentence would be excessive
in his case. 3 45 Miller could be interpreted as an instance where
the Court, and Justice Kennedy in particular, embraced procedural regulation. After all, in practice, it requires jurors or
judges to make additional findings. However, in Montgomery,
ostensibly a case about retroactivity, Justice Kennedy's opinion for the Court put a substantive gloss on the Miller rule:
Because Miller determined that sentencing a child to life
without parole is excessive for all but 'the rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects irreparable corruption,' it rendered life without parole an unconstitutional penalty for 'a
class of defendants because of their status'-that is, juvenile
offenders whose crimes reflect the transient immaturity of
youth.3 4 6
In sum, then, at least in dicta, Justice Kennedy's gloss in Miller
places the case within the paradigm of the categorical exemptions cases.
If the Eighth Amendment jurisprudence becomes more robust, the Court likely will need to engage in this line drawing
exercise between mandatory sentences and use of the sentence
in all instances more regularly. By way of preview, the Iowa
Supreme Court recently decided in State v. Lyle that under the
Iowa state constitution, juveniles cannot be subjected to
mandatory minimum sentences at all.347 Moreover, in a recent
petition for certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, an
Alabama man asserts that mandatory life imprisonment is an
excessive punishment for non-violent crimes involving the personal use of marijuana.3 4 8 One, too, could imagine challenges
to mandatory life without parole for adults who commit serious
non-homicide crimes or even for felony murder. It is true that
the typical juvenile has both a diminished moral capacity and a
great capacity for change. But the reality is that most people
can change, and many of them profoundly so. This is particularly the case, perhaps even more so, for offenders who suffer
Id. at 2469.
Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 734 (2016) (quoting Miller, 132 S.
Ct. at 2469, and Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 330 (1989)) (internal citations
omitted).
347
State v. Lyle, 854 N.W.2d 378, 380-81 (Iowa 2014).
348
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 10-12, Brooker v. Alabama, 136 S. Ct.
1659 (2016). Brooker lived with his son in Houston County, and court documents
show police found a marijuana-growing operation there during a search in 2011.
The elderly man was convicted of drug trafficking, and a judge sentenced him to
life without parole because of past robbery convictions in Florida. Id. at 6-8.
345
346

482

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 102:413

from untreated mental illness and addiction. The short of it is
that the Court will need to address how and where to draw
lines around mandatory sentences.
One sensible solution would be for the Court to use its own
independent judgment to glean whether the punishment practice is excessive. If the question proves debatable, but not resolvable, then the invalidation of mandatory minimum
sentences that involve the challenged punishment practice
would facilitate an important infusion of usage information
that the Court could use to help it glean the standards of decency for a future case as to the challenged practice as a whole.
Another solution is to only invalidate mandatory minimum
sentences in circumstances where a strong legislative consensus has emerged against the practice. But this wooden approach suffers from the same problems that legislative bean
counting always suffers-harsh laws, infrequently enacted
during moments of moral panic, do not account adequately for
real defendants in real cases. The result, not infrequently, is
retributive extravagance. Thus, with mandatory minimum
sentences the question is when does the mandatory nature of
the sentence so risk disproportionality that the Court should
intervene to require individualization, so as to reduce the risk
of retail level over-punishment and begin the process of gaining
more reliable on-the-ground consensus indicators as the excessiveness of the punishment as a wihole. But what happens
when there is no jury or judge to empower? That's the question
we take up in the next subsection.
2.

When the Typical Usage IndicatorsAre Inapplicable:
Solitary Confinement

When a judge sentences a person to prison the inclusion of
long-term solitary confinement is not a part of that sentence.3 4 9
Nonetheless, the cruel and unusual punishments clause applies to a prisoner placed in an "isolation cell." 3 5 0 Indeed,
Judge Alex Kozinski, the Chief Judge of the Federal Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, has called solitary confinement
349
Solitary confinement is a disciplinary measure administered by prison authorities and not the courts. See, e.g., Wolff v. McDonnell 418 U.S. 539, 556
(1974) ("Prison disciplinary proceedings are not part of a criminal prosecution,
and the full panoply of rights due a defendant in such proceedings does not
apply"); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 475 (1972) ("{Prison officials must
have large discretion in making .. . determinations, and . . . courts should retain
their traditional reluctance to interfere with disciplinary matters properly under
the control of state prison authorities.").
350 Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 685 (1978).
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"the most severe punishment" and "worse than death."3 5 1 Last
year, Justice Kennedy wrote in a separate concurring opinion
that because "years on end of near-total isolation exact a terrible price . . . the judiciary may be required" to place limits on
the use of solitary confinement. 3 5 2 But how could the Court,
using its consensus analysis, determine whether solitary confinement is an extravagant punishment when it is applied, for
instance, as a means of punishing minor prison infractions or
when it is imposed upon juveniles or the mentally ill (a practice
that one federal court called "the mental equivalent of putting
an asthmatic in a place with little air to breathe"3 5 3 )?
The question would be easy if this were a practice like
mandatory juvenile life without parole for a homicide offense.
The Court could do as it did in Miler and require individualized
sentencing. 3 54 In turn, the individualized sentencing would
provide data over time into whether the punishment of life
without parole generally is unconstitutionally harsh. But there
is no jury or judge making these decisions in the context of
solitary confinement.
One option is to treat the prison guards who make the
decisions to impose solitary confinement as the relevant indicator of consensus, and query how unusual the practice is across
America. The problem with that approach, however, is that
while jurors and judges are neutral parties, prison guards are
not. Indeed, a prison guard or warden deciding whether to
impose solitary confinement as a punitive measure is akin to a
prosecutor taking over sentencing for the judge or jury.
Second, the Court might decide to inject a local, transparent, neutral decision maker before a prolonged stint of isolation
is imposed. For instance, for any use of solitary confinement
over thirty days, the Court might require the states to craft a
meaningful process that enables both transparency and a role
for neutral observers to be included in the processes. If this
injection of local, transparent decision makers results in very
few instances of prolonged isolation for juveniles or the mentally ill, then the Court would learn over time about the societal
351

Alex Kozinski, Worse Than Death, 125 YALE L.J.F. 230, 230 (2016) (arguing

against the excessive use of solitary confinement in American prisons).
352
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Davis v. Ayala, 135 S. Ct. 2187, 2210 (2015) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F. Supp. 1146, 1265 (N.D. Cal. 1995).

Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2467 (2012) ("That correspondenceGraham's '[t]reat[mentl [of] juvenile life sentences as analogous to capital punishment'-makes relevant here a second line of our precedents, demanding individualized sentencing when imposing the death penalty." (quoting Graham v. Florida,
560 U.S. 48, 89 (2010) (Roberts, C.J., concurring in judgment))).

484

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 102:413

norms on the punitive use of prolonged solitary confinement.
But the downside of this approach is that it would take the
Court back down the path where its institutional competence is
at its nadir.
A third option, which finds expression in Obergefell, is
turning to a broader range of democratic discourse to glean
retributive excess.3 5 5 These broader range of materials include, for example, "referenda, legislative debates, and grassroots campaigns, as well as countless studies, papers,
books, . . . other popular and scholarly writings," and the
knowledge gleaned from "extensive litigation in state and federal courts."3 5 6 Resolving which approach is best is beyond the
scope of this Article. However, this is but one example of a
scenario where under a more robust Eighth Amendment the
Court will need to refine its current understanding of the tools
available to gauge contemporary standards of decency.
Here, then, it is wise to sound caution at the notion that
the Court should move forward based on a broader range of
democratic discourse, though without objective indicia that at
least mimic the richness of the outcomes of jury trials or judge
sentencing. If the Court invalidates a punishment practice
without the benefit of that more robust usage data, the likelihood increases that the Court miscalculates in its determination that a punishment serves no legitimate purpose. If it
calculates poorly, there is a risk of creating a backlash that
triggers a federal constitutional amendment (perhaps this is
not realistic in the context of solitary confinement, but change
the factual hypothesis to the context of sex offender registries
and the probabilities shift). Moreover, even without the risk of
error or backlash, the Court expends some of its institutional
credibility when it invalidates a punishment that people notice
is missing from the set of democratic tools, even if those punishments are marginally excessive.
As Justice Kennedy said in the wake of Obergefell, "when
we have a controversial case-and a very difficult case like
[same-sex marriage]-we draw down on a capital of trust, a
deposit of trust, and we have to rebuild that capital. We have to
put new deposits, new substance into this reservoir of
trust."3 5 7 A robust set of usage indicators, including sentencSee Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2605 (2015).
Id.
357
Robert Barnes, The Supreme Court: Too Liberal?, WASH. POST, (July 26,
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ing practices and geographic isolation, significantly limit the
capital drawn from the trust. When those indicators are missing, however, it becomes a more difficult balancing act on the
margins-an independent judicial belief that a punishment
practice is excessive versus the risk of taking a legitimate tool
out of circulation or damaging the credibility of the Court. A
practice such as prolonged solitary confinement, especially as
it is used for punishment of minor infractions or imposed upon
juveniles or the mentally ill, is so extreme and our medical
literature so robust that the downside risks seem to pale in
comparison to the known excess. But this might not be the
case with future challenges to a punishment practice; and, in
those instances, there is a serious tension in the jurisprudence
ahead for the Court to resolve. Sounding a warning is not the
same thing as deciding a question though, and we leave it to
future scholarship to parse out these nuances in more depth.
CONCLUSION

This Article has argued that the conventional understanding of the scope of Eighth Amendment protections against cruel
and unusual punishment is too limited. The moral panics of
the 1980s and 90s, including, for example, the crack-baby and
super-predator scares, provide startling contemporary examples of why the authors of the Eighth Amendment sought to
remove the question of excess punishment-when a punishment serves no legitimate purpose that a lesser sanction could
not fulfill-from the rough and tumble of majoritarian politics.
Fortunately, though the U.S. Supreme Court has long been
derelict in its duty to fulfill this critical function, the justices
have begun to shape the nuances of the doctrine in a way that
could foretell a far more robust jurisprudence. Specifically, the
Court has begun to use its categorical exemption framework to
bar excessive punishments as they relate to categories of offenses or classes of offenders. Within that framework, the
Court has been especially focused on preventing retributive
excess (as opposed to arbitrariness or discrimination among
those offenders otherwise eligible for the punishment). And, in
the effort to squelch retributive excess, the Court has created a
more sophisticated analysis for assessing whether there is a
societal consensus that reflects the excessiveness of the sanction. The hallmark of this more robust approach is an in1215475949f4_story.html
original).
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creased importance on where and how often the punishment is
used in practice. Taken together, these doctrinal changescombined with a clearer theoretical purpose and jurisprudential approach-are the seeds of a more robust role for the Court
in protecting citizens against excessive punishment.

